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Phenomenology is a form of philosophical inquiry using the disclosure of an 
object or experience to a public audience. A phenomenology of mis-education, therefore, 
would relate the experience of mis-education in a public and open fashion. In order to 
describe the elements of mis-education of Africana people groups, especially African-
Americans, in public spaces of education the methodology of phenomenology is 
employed here to give a view into the sides, aspects, profiles, absences and presences, 
and identity in manifold of this experiential phenomenon. Mis-education as it is used here 
comes from the seminal work of Carter G. Woodson entitled The Mis-education of the 
Negro. Utilizing the voice of Carter G. Woodson, the double consciousness of W.E.B. 
DuBois in Souls of Black Folk, the dialectical ascent of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
in Phenomenology of Spirit, the psycho-affective work of Frantz Fanon in Black Skin 
White Masks and Wretched of the Earth, and the reflective voice and gaze of Malcolm X 
in his autobiography and published works; this series of five essays is a preliminary look 
into the experience of the black in mis-education.
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PREFACE 
Eighty years is a lengthy amount of time for anything. Just think eighty years ago 
prohibition of alcohol was in effect in our country. Now alcohol is ubiquitous and can be 
bought in some of the same places where milk is sold. In eighty years, perceptions 
change, people change and pass away, and our world usually changes with it. Looking at 
natural changes, technological changes, and even the changes of some of the global 
boundaries within eighty years, it is easy to expect change in most if not all areas of life. 
We would assume a greater amount of change in areas of life that demand the most from 
us. There are expectations in modern society for individuals to have the capacity to work 
for example. This work requires that we be trained and prepared to fulfill the roles 
outlined for us through such training. But, what occurs when this is not happening? What 
about if the occurrence continued for eighty years and actually appeared worse with 
time? We might say that such an occurrence was a betrayal of our capacity for 
innovation, our bend toward productivity, and the pervasive knowledge that sweeps our 
globe that is only a mouse-click away from our apprehension. Yet, it is a part of a 
document written in 1933 by a man named Carter G. Woodson about a group of people 
namely African-Americans.1  
After eighty years of his text in publication, I was surprised to see the work of Dr. 
Carter G. Woodson not utilized by professors of education in current publication. I saw 
1 Woodson uses the archaic term Negroes. 
v 
 
                                                          
the term mis-education on several books by notable authors like Noam Chomsky2 and 
Svi Shapiro3. I even saw mis-education utilized in the Hip-Hop genre. Lauryn Hill’s The 
Mis-Education of Lauryn Hill comes to mind as a salient example. Yet, in my searching I 
did not find anyone that commemorated Woodson’s contribution to scholarship in 
presenting his text, nor did I find like in the Journal of Black Studies five years ago, a 
commemorative mention of eighty years of the text. This is troubling to me as an 
Africana scholar. 
Imagine John Dewey not being commemorated on the anniversary of Democracy 
and Education or Martin Heidegger not being acknowledge for an anniversary of Being 
and Time and possibly you see my lament at such an oversight. We acknowledge the 
works of a Dewey or a Heidegger as making a significant contribution to the world of 
scholarship and even more so to how we think about our scholarship and our world. 
Perhaps we don’t see Woodson in the same light. Here, I digress. 
Instead of cursing the darkness of oversight in a failure to acknowledge The Mis-
Education of the Negro I wanted to make a contribution to the field of Africana Studies, 
phenomenology, and begin a conversation on Woodson that might spark some new 
interest in his work. For purposes of full disclosure I will say that I am an African-
American male who happens to be an Africana scholar. The field of Africana Studies, a 
field of endeavor said to be partly attributed to Dr. Carter G. Woodson, is concerned with 
the historical, cultural, and scholastic contribution of people of the African continent and 
2 Chomsky on Mis-Education 
3 Losing Heart: The Moral and Spiritual Mis-Education of America’s Children 
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African Diaspora. This includes American blacks, Caribbean blacks, South American 
blacks, and Africans throughout the world. Individuals that work within this area of study 
include scholars of times past like Woodson, DuBois, Fanon, Malcolm X, and present-
day scholars like Lewis Gordon, Nigel Gibson, Stuart Hall, Cornel West, and Henry 
Louis Gates. The purpose of such scholars and their work is to bring relevance to the 
contributions of Africana peoples and the struggles that have been endured through often 
overlooked experiences such as the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and colonialization of 
nations populated by Africana peoples that were or still are rich in natural resources.  
This was the life-work of Carter G. Woodson and he traveled extensively as an 
educator seeking this end. Woodson does not stand alone in his take on what occurs in 
spaces of education. One need only look at the ongoing dialogue between Booker T. 
Washington and W.E.B. DuBois to see that the education of a black mind in America was 
a hot topic of debate. We have for years contended with the problem of blacks 
underperforming in education and must ask questions about our efforts to reform the 
dismal trends we see. For instance, have we applied some of Woodson’s suggestions? He 
advocates for blacks taking more initiative in planning out the education of their children 
and not leaving such responsibilities in the hands of individuals with resources, but 
possibly not vested interest in the success or failure of African-American children. Have 
we asked how segregation hurt our education of black children and does it still hurt black 
children? Or have we developed in our treatment of students in public education to insure 
equal treatment to individuals that may be of a different color or ethnicity? And 
ultimately, have we implemented the suggestions of Woodson with all our data and 
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innovations for educational spaces? Therefore in commemoration of eighty-years of 
Woodson’s text on mis-education I submit my contribution and work in honor of his 
scholarship. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In a course on Film and Philosophy with the University of North Carolina – 
Greensboro’s Cultural Foundations department I found a “voice” in the work of Frantz 
Fanon. For years I had in my possession a tattered second-hand copy of The Wretched of 
the Earth in my library that though skimmed and highlighted at interesting points, laid 
idle upon my bookshelf. For the course I was to choose a “lens”, a voice of philosophy, a 
tradition in which to view a series of films with and relate them (the films and 
philosophical body of work) to education. It was the first time I felt like a “philosopher”. 
I understood Fanon. From his incipient text, Black Skin White Masks, I began to 
understand why I felt at times like a body in space and not a person in certain places. 
From his incendiary, The Wretched of the Earth, I learned the effects of colonization on 
oppressor and oppressed from the pen of a psychiatrist in the Third World. 
But, the story does not end with Fanon, the issue of Fanon and violence began to 
emerge in many of my papers and talks about his philosophy. In conference proceedings 
for the National Council of Black Studies (NCBS), I was confronted on Fanonian 
scholars who disagreed with my appeal to a Fanonian violence that did not include 
conventional arms. I carried myself well, but began to see the violent emergence of the 
colonized as a key to decolonization arise again and again in critics of my work. At the 
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NCBS conference I was also intrigued with the scholarship of Africana studies professors 
from across the country as they explicated the work of Manning Marable in presenting 
Malcolm X. I will not endeavor to discuss those arguments and lines of reasoning behind 
his text here, but will say it included the passion I learned was worthy of any scholar, a 
title which is seldom associated formally with the likes of Malcolm X. 
My history with Malcolm X goes back to the sixth grade when I initially read The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X. Its words lifted off the page for me as I heard about a 
young Malcolm Little, a middle schooler like me, being told that he could not be what he 
wanted in life. Two years later I would have a similar situation occur and I felt equipped 
by the armory of words spoken to me as a twelve year old on my bed by that elder 
statesman in the guise of Malcolm X.  
In viewing a Malcolm X and Frantz Fanon I began to see a story unfolding of race 
relations that had ties to education and philosophy. A course on phenomenology began to 
solidify these ties into a body of work that drew from Africana philosophy. From Fanon I 
was introduced to Lewis Gordon, whose Introduction to Africana Philosophy included an 
appeal to W. E. B. DuBois. In my excitement I reread Souls of Black Folk with fresh eyes 
opened to see that DuBois was leading me and any one that chose to read his work into 
what a “black soul” looks like. This soul would sing melancholy songs, would mourn, or 
improvise a jazz tune. This soul also was “gifted” with a second sight, wore a “veil”, and 
was dually conscious of being black in body, but American in location. Gordon also 
appeals to Carter G. Woodson as the father of black studies. Many are familiar with his 
work entitled “The Mis-education of the Negro,” yet I was amazed to find little work in 
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regard to the continued relevance of the text, especially with it being eighty years this 
along with the voices of Africana studies and phenomenology are the influences of this 
work. 
My intent in writing these phenomenological essays was an attempt to answer, 
like Hegel, what the “spirit” of the “black” looks like. Hegel became of interest due to 
Fanon’s distinct use of his Lord and Slave Dialectic in his Black Skin White Masks text. 
Intrigued, I endeavored to show a process of how the black experience may emerge in 
like fashion. Unlike Hegel’s movement from sense to absolute Spirit, for me it was 
concerned with spirit to experience and thus the subtitle, “Phenomenology of Mis-
education.” 
This work is a tribute to my sons that they may someday read these essays, like I 
read the words of Malcolm X. Understanding the sequential, movement of experience of 
the black mind and body may be of importance to understand why Woodson would detail 
the “Negro” as being in the process of mis-education in spaces of learning. Therefore, I 
submit the following work based on the outlined essays below. 
This dissertation will consist of a collection of six essays on the question of 
consciousness in the phenomenon of mis-education. 
The first essay in this work is entitled “Still Mis-Educated: Commemorating 80 
Years of Mis-Education of the Negro.” This section will discuss how after eighty years of 
Carter G. Woodson's seminal text, "The Mis-education of the Negro", African-Americans 
and many people of African descent appear to still be mis-educated. Woodson's text 
outlines areas of concern and notably describes the concept of a race concept and a 
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historical consciousness within his work. The power and strength of acknowledged 
history and knowledge of the history of a people group will be described here in the 
context of African-American males.  
My second essay, “Masks, Veils, and Invisible People: A Phenomenology of 
DuBoisian Double Consciousness” attempts to describe the veil of DuBois in relation to 
people of Africana descent. DuBois seminal text, The Souls of Black Folk, engages the 
reader into the dynamic nature of what the soul of Black folks looks like. He begins his 
description with the disclosure of a posed question, "What does it feel like to be a 
'problem'?" From this starting point, DuBois discloses the Black male or female as a 
seventh son behind the diversities of people in the world gifted with a veil, a “second 
sight”. This chapter will describe the historical and folk significance of this veil and also 
disclose the next theme that emerges in the phenomenon of DuBois’s writing in terms of 
the soulical aspect of the Black, double consciousness. Double consciousness will be 
described in DuBois's terms and explicated in terms of the experience of African-
American males as if they are behind a veil and doubly conscious of their view and 
viewing from this vantage point. 
Hegelian Dialectic and African-American Education introduces Georg Wilhelm 
Fredrich Hegel’s philosophy to describe mis-education and constitutes the third essay. 
Hegel is described as a philosopher of history and points to the element of the historical 
in his philosophy. One of Hegel's most notable works, The Phenomenology of Spirit, is a 
movement from the empirical aspect of the consciousness (that of the senses) to that of 
the absolute ideal (Absolute spirit). Such movement from the empirical to the ideal 
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components of our reality was the basis for the philosophy of Karl Marx who stopped 
well short of the “Absolute Spirit” to highlight the materialist bend of humanity void of 
an Absolute immaterial, ideal or Spirit. Other significant philosophical concepts such as 
existentialism (vis-a-vis Kierkegaard, Sartre, Nietzsche) can be attributed to Hegel's 
philosophical method. However, Hegel has been rarely utilized to describe the 
educational position of people of Africana-descent in education. This essay describes a 
dialectic methodology that incorporates a hermeneutic-phenomenological bend to 
philosophical inquiry. In meeting this end, the essay will briefly describe Hegel's brand of 
philosophy, disclose how his philosophical method can be used, and give a concrete 
example utilizing a historical perspective of Blacks in education and how the situation 
has turned on its head in dialectical fashion. 
The fourth essay “Fanon’s Backdoor: The Mis-education of Frantz Fanon” 
presents a twist in how we view Woodson’s backdoor. Frantz Fanon is renowned and 
often relegated to his chapter Concerning Violence in The Wretched of the Earth. 
However, beneath the diatribe of violence is a substantial philosopher with an intense 
system of thought on how decolonization takes place in the psychoaffective domain. 
Utilizing Fanon's work in Black Skin White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth, this 
essay will describe mis-education in terms of Fanon's postcolonial theory and movement 
towards decolonization. Using postcolonial theory as a framework within the dialectic 
method, mis-education will be read in terms of Woodson's disclosure of the phenomenon 
and Fanon's description of what a mis-educative consciousness would look like from a 
historically constrained perspective. 
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The fifth essay presents the life and work of Malcolm X in “That Rock Landed on 
Us: Race and Mis-education in the Work of Malcolm X.” This essay will describe a case-
in-point of mis-education and a radical conscientious reversal of its derogatory elements. 
Using Malcolm X as an example, this chapter will look at elements of Woodson's mis-
education in the life of Malcolm X and the dialectical mechanisms used to turn the effects 
of mis-education on its end in order to overcome it.  
This series of essays is concluded with a concluding essay that serves as a 
phenomenological analysis of the previous works in collective fashion. The concluding 
essay is intended to show the efficacy of the phenomenological inquiry as a method and 
showcase the relevance toward Africana people groups in education. 
Why Phenomenology? 
I chose phenomenology as a means to divulge this philosophical inquiry due to 
the efficacy of phenomenology and its requisite analysis to make the experience of a 
phenomenon public. Whether this phenomenon is the intentionality towards an object or 
a concept it reaches its best when bracketing from the natural attitude and allowed to be 
disclosed through the transcendental ego. There are hidden things in plain view like 
DuBois’s doubly conscious, veiled African-American. Within this group of essays I 
endeavored to not mention race in particular in terms of racism, power dynamics, 
capitalism, gentrification, or any other host of terms to describe race dynamics that have 
an effect in schools and educational institutions. However, these things are inferred when 
the reader, in public space, renders a word or words to describe a phenomenon as loaded 
with racialized meaning. Mis-education as a concept did not appear to me to have such a 
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weighty connotation in dialogue about the topic. Therefore, I deemed it necessary to 
engage in a phenomenological reduction to introduce the concept in the public space. 
Modern scholarship might call this a gap in the literature. 
Phenomenology is chosen to intend or experience mis-education, double 
consciousness, colonization, and personal and collective histories of the black.4 I am 
looking for the hidden essence, the eidetic reduction without proposing anything. The 
proposals are left to the reader, of which I am included. Reflecting upon this work I 
would like to see my experience, the experience of my sons, and the experience of 
students of color in light of a Woodson, DuBois, Fanon, Malcolm X, or Hegel. Proposals 
are nice and often sterile ways of addressing the problems that we see. Yet, realities as 
they are experienced are messy and marred with our perceptions. Phenomenology may 
just allow us to perceive the reality as it is, as opposed to how we propose it is in our 
eyes. 
In asking, what is the experience of the black in spaces of education? We might 
notice that the black in time and space is often relegated to a body. In this work a body is 
disclosed as being a boundary that is met with a border or a gate to hinder its passage. 
There are doors that a black body must singularly walk through with its own legs, its own 
strength, and its own balance. The black body as an object is never disclosed as a 
subjective entity. Herein we see Hegel’s Master and Slave at work. Fanon would call 
such a dynamic as non-existent in the experience of the black. Perhaps the interaction is 
4 I like to use Fanon’s translated term from Black Skin White Masks 
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not one of desire and recognition,5 but of actually being the other, which is entirely 
different. What does it mean to be someone else? Is it even possible? It is as if Fanon 
phenomenological bend in its intention of black and colonized bodies upon an eidetic 
reduction of this noema views itself from the transcendental ego as an entity that doesn’t 
desire or seek to be recognized as a subject, but rather wants to be identified as something 
altogether different from what it presents itself to be historically and from the parameters 
imposed upon it currently. 
What Does It Mean To Be Phenomenological? 
Phenomenology examines phenomenon from a transcendent gaze. In order to 
examine what it means to be phenomenological could very easily be relegated to 
definitions found in classical Husserlian phenomenology. However, in examining why 
phenomenology was used for this work, a concept of phenomenological might be better 
suited to examine this system of inquiry through the lens of a Fanon or a DuBois for 
example. A phenomenon in and of itself is innocuous, yet loaded with meaning. Instead 
of intending the black body for instance, we might intend the activity of the black body in 
order to showcase the experience of a black body. A black body is more than just a 
covering of skin that is darkened by melanin and the sun. We might speak of color, but 
we would also need to discuss movement, is this not what black bodies, bodies in general, 
do? I recall Malcolm X, a man of “blackened” body, who enjoyed dancing with other 
black bodies and also white ones (X, 1992). 
5 As is the case for Hegel’s depiction per Kojeve and Hyppolite 
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Black bodies are not simply racialized, but relegated to spaces so we often find it 
hard to see them for what they are in reality. This is a reason for phenomenology and a 
bend toward being phenomenological. Being phenomenological might inquire, for 
instance, as to why black bodies are bombarded by borders, boundaries, and ways to be 
viewed and examined. A history of the black body reveals that the slave paradigm 
exploited this recurring phenomenon. However, the black body as it was treated in the 
times of slavery is apparent at times today. Objectification of bodies in sex, sports, and 
even how we discipline and punish are all points of perusal to examine this phenomenon. 
Towards a Phenomenology of Mis-Education 
Mis-education as a phenomenon looks at the act of how education takes place. 
There is an education. We might say that education has learning in it, instruction in 
subject matter, a building of knowledge, understanding, application, and a level of 
independence to implement the thing or things learned. Dialectically, the concept of mis-
education is perhaps no different from a conceptual practice of mis-education. The 
difference between the two is possibly a thin line, a distinct border that defines where 
education and mis-education diverge. Much like the two roads in Robert Frost’s poem it 
is contingent upon the choice of which you will take. Maybe you have to take them both. 
Perhaps it is not about a choice, but an experience. Could this be the folly of how we 
engage in our current paradigm of multiple choice testing? The test is not the education, it 
is the summation of all that should be learned, or so we are told. Perhaps it is because we 
are told so often and not given the experiences necessary that mis-education occurs. What 
are mis-educated minds and bodies told that educated bodies and minds are not? Perhaps 
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we constantly say to the mis-educated, you learned this, when in reality this thing learned 
does not educate the individual, but places a border that makes it hard to naturalize 
oneself back across. 
I have spent time in places of education both being “educated” and “educating”. 
Initially I can admit that I had no interest in taking the education back to a particular 
community from whence I came. As a matter of fact, it was education that allowed me to 
understand the community I matriculated from. My community had to be learned, 
experienced, and embraced over time. My understanding of the process of education is 
now understood to be one of giving back to my community. As a black male I understand 
that this black body that I reside is relegated to a community of which my race denotes. 
However, my community is more than a skin color, it is more than my body, and even 
more than my capacity to reason. In mis-education I embrace that my community is no 
more than those that look like me. This is as much folly as saying that those with tenor or 
baritone voices like my own are my community. Or perhaps only my gender is my 
community. People are more than colors, more than their voices, more than their 
maleness or femalehood. We are experiences, choices, our instruction, and that of which 
we are exposed, black bodies exemplify this well as we see not just black bodies, but 
bodies in general that are exposed to elements of cold or heat, that experience pain, and 
as Fanon states in Black Skin White Masks, it “tenses” (Fanon, 1952/2008). 
This mis-education has its basis on the issues and how they are interpreted or how 
we are taught to interpret them. Education does not teach what we are to think, but better 
how thinking should occur. Whereas mis-education says think this, regardless of the 
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parameters, the race of the individual, or even the circumstances affecting how your 
thinking might be in time and space. Perhaps Woodson’s mis-education is along this 
wise. Potentially, we may all be a little mis-educated. There may be occasions where we 
want pre-fabricated thinking mechanisms, paradigms without the arduousness of 
reflection. The tedium of thinking and the requisite practices that thinking involves 
requires our responsibility to accept the consequences behind thinking that may be 
considered poor and the humility required for thinking that may be considered “good” or 
even “great” thinking. A phenomenology of mis-education looks at thinking as the 
product, without simply relegating such thinking as black or white, but as thinking pure 
and simple.  
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CHAPTER II 
STILL MIS-EDUCATED?: COMMEMORATING EIGHTY YEARS OF  
CARTER G. WOODSON’S MIS-EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO 
 
 
In commemoration of the eighty years in which The Mis-education of the Negro 
has been in publication it would be interesting to dialogue with Dr. Woodson about 
today’s educational climate. If granted such an opportunity I would ask, “Are we still 
mis-educated?” The response to this question could take on many forms and travel down 
many avenues to disclose the answer of Woodson. We of course do not know what his 
exact words would be, but can be assured that the answer would most likely be a “yes”. I 
am of an opinion that if Dr. Woodson were alive today, few, if any, of his suggestions 
would change save the examples gleaned from different schools across the United States. 
Woodson would find an educational landscape not much different than the one he 
evaluated in his 1933 treatise.  
In spite of Woodson’s text, which highlighted areas of improvement and focused 
the gaze of our efforts, we are still in a state of mis-education. From reading Woodson, I 
believe he would offer no new solutions, but point to what he has already supplied. Sure, 
he may bring harsh indictment upon the African-American community for our 
distractions to real issues and our inability to come together for the common good of the 
people, but his critique would be the same. His critique of “the Negro” was that this great 
race of people, having been disconnected from its history is no more than a poor imitation 
12 
 
of European culture. Therefore, we see Woodson’s work as not just a book, but a call to 
the collective consciousness of Africana people. 
Perhaps Woodson would have much to say about our current paradigm of 
standardized testing, No Child Left Behind legislation, and general intellectual, legal, and 
pedagogical changes in light of legislative and ideological changes brought about by the 
1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education and A Nation at 
Risk, for example. Considering the changes that have emerged within the window of time 
between Woodson’s publication and today, how has the status of Africana people 
changed for the better? If we were to take one segment of this population, say African-
American males, what would our findings indicate about the progress out of mis-
education these eighty years later? Ultimately, if we were to reprise the pages of The Mis-
education of the Negro, beyond semantics and examples, how much of mis-education has 
changed in eighty years? 
In 1933, Dr. Carter G. Woodson noted that, “No people can go forward when the 
majority of those who should know better have chosen to go backward (p. 123).” 
Woodson’s quote simply states that when presented with these options, most of our 
African-American students, especially the males in this particular case, make a choice to 
move backward. Svi Shapiro’s (2006) assertion that students are learning the “game” of 
schooling may fit well in this explanation (p. 11). A true educational experience in which 
the drop out numbers amongst African-American males are not a reality entail both 
technical skills to “open doors” and “critical and creative thinking to participate” in 
“meaningful” work (Delpit, 2006, p. 19). One way in which mis-education continues is, 
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as Lisa Delpit (2006) states, “to imply that it doesn’t matter how you talk or how you 
write (p. 39).” Well-meaning movements have stressed a student’s culture without the 
emphasis of how of dominant culture impacts social interaction. Richard Rorty (1999) 
writes that “secondary education is a matter of socialization” into the “common sense of 
the society as it is” (p. 116). If, as Rorty says, primary and secondary education serves as 
a “familiarizing” agent of our young people into what is seen as “acceptably true” 
(whether right or wrongly so), what occurs when students do not learn how to effectively 
combat these assertions? It is for this reason that I present my work in commemoration of 
this eighty year milestone of Dr. Carter G. Woodson’s text and seek to explore the 
relevance and pervasive nature of what he called, The Mis-education of the Negro. 
An Overview of The Mis-education of the Negro 
Quotes from Woodson’s text give a general snapshot of the key points of mis-
education. Taken together, Woodson’s words identify to the reader the what, how, and 
why of the mis-education of the Negro. For the purpose of reviewing this text I have 
separated the chosen quotes into the what, the how, and the why of mis-education in order 
to annotate and explain the work of Carter G. Woodson and to define mis-education as 
Woodson uses it in his text. 
What is Mis-education? 
 
 
The only question which concerns us here is whether these "educated" persons are 
actually equipped to face the ordeal before them or unconsciously contribute to 
their own undoing by perpetuating the regime of the oppressor. (Woodson, 
1933/2004, p. xv) 
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Woodson begins his prefatory remarks by stating that the information disclosed in 
his text is based upon firsthand experience with the Negro in American education. From 
reading The Mis-education of the Negro, you get the underlying sense that Woodson has 
traveled extensively and interacted with individuals to come to the conclusions presented 
in his book. Here he asks whether or not the “educated” are aware of their immersion in a 
regime he feels is originated and supported by the “oppressor.” It is interesting to note 
that the “oppressor’s regime” is apparently the contributor of the “educated members” of 
which Woodson speaks. Therefore, the first aspect of mis-education is that an 
“education” is presented to members of a group. 
The “education” presented is one in which training to “think what is desired” 
from another and hereby enslaves the mind. In 1933, when Woodson publishes this text, 
slavery had been over for quite some time. This presentation is interesting in that it notes 
a shift from physical enslavement backed by the laws of its time to an acceptable 
enslavement of mind by both oppressor and the oppressed.  
 
The thought of the immediate reward, shortsightedness, and the lack of vision and 
courage to struggle and win the fight made them failures to begin with. 
(Woodson, 1933/2004, p. 47) 
 
 
The enslaved mind or mindset is accomplished in training the thought to focus on 
“immediate reward, shortsightedness, and lack of vision and courage.” This new form of 
enslavement bred an unwillingness to struggle and fight for success. In Woodson’s words 
it also made them “failures” and “beggars” for opportunity. 
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If you make a man think that he is justly an outcast, you do not have to order him 
to the back door. He will go without being told; and if there is no back door, his 
very nature will demand one. (Woodson, 1933/2004, p. 84) 
 
 
Woodson’s backdoor quote is my personal favorite of the whole text. It actually 
appears twice within the work (once in the preface and once in the ninth chapter). This 
quote solidifies what mis-education would look like not just amongst African-Americans, 
but amongst any group that is taught that they were only good enough for a “backdoor.” 
Though metaphorical we see a type of reality of this backdoor as blacks are forced to 
used “colored” entrances, bathrooms, fountains and sections prior to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. It was the conscious actions of many African-Americans to not take a 
“backdoor” mentality, but to be recognized as equal citizens that began the change in 
American society. 
 
Philosophers have long conceded, however, that every man has two educations: 
"that which is given to him, and the other that which he gives himself. (Woodson, 
1933/2004, p. 126)6 
 
 
According to Woodson, every man is given an education. Personal responsibility 
dictates that you give another to yourself. For Woodson you must “work out and 
conquer” this information or realization for yourself as an individual. The true 
nourishment comes from what we “teach” ourselves. My reading of Woodson here is that 
a type of creativity and critical thinking is at work here in this teaching of the self. 
6 The concept of two educations fits within the paradigm of W.E.B. DuBois’s double consciousness as he states the 
concept of the black ever feeling “his two-ness” (p. 5). 
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According to Woodson, this element is lost if we merely accept the words of others 
without a critical eye of interpretation and translation creatively to our particular worlds. 
The majority of Negro education, according to Woodson, has come from without. 
Meaning that for Woodson, a Negro in his day was only “half-educated” or in his words 
inappropriately, insufficiently educated (mis-educated). Such a person has received 
partial intellectual development. Woodson furthers his argument with stating that such an 
individual may have developed “negatively”. Without the requisite full education, he 
submits that there will be lacking mental power due to an “ill-fed brain.” 
 
Instead of cramming the Negro's mind with what others have shown that they can 
do, we should develop his latent powers that he may perform in society a part of 
which others are not capable. (Woodson, 1933/2004, p. 151) 
 
 
 This last quote gives us the understanding that Woodson’s aspirations and 
expectations for the African-Americans of his day were lofty and obtainable. His 
expectation was that a properly educated Negro populous would be able to fill a void in 
our society that only a Negro mind could. It was to the detriment of society that we fail to 
properly educate the minds of all citizens. For Woodson, we have allowed a vast territory 
of latent power to lie dormant and untapped in not properly educating the “Negro mind.” 
 From these quotes we can surmise that Woodson’s definition of mis-education is 
a partial or negative development by cramming the mind with what others have shown 
that they can do. The purpose of such mis-education is to bring an infusion of the 
oppressor’s regime of seeking after immediate reward, shortsightedness, and the lack of 
vision and courage to struggle and win the fight. In bringing about such a regime of mis-
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education it further trains the “educated” to think what is desired of him or her and 
determines what a person shall think, brings a feeling of inferiority. As we disclose the 
work of Woodson’s mis-education this should be used as a working definition for what is 
meant by the term mis-education.   
How does Mis-education Occur? 
 The curriculum presented in Woodson’s day was one of the first components of 
an answer to the “how” of mis-education. “Holding the Negro down,” is used to describe 
what occurs when subjects “present a code” for the purpose of “control”. Therefore, the 
first component of the how of mis-education is this presentation of a “code” for the sole 
purpose of control. 
 
When you control a man's thinking you do not have to worry about his 
actions…You do not need to send him to the back door...he will cut one for his 
special benefit…His education makes it necessary. (Woodson, 1933/2004, p. xvii) 
 
 
As aforementioned, Woodson utilizes the above quote on two occasions in his 
text. Here, it actually follows the previous sentiment of the presentation of a “code of 
morals” enacting control. Once this code is established as a framework, the thinking takes 
over. This thinking is a consequence of the training given and entails that the “proper 
place” is adhered to. Woodson even adds that creativity in crafting such access to the 
specified “proper place” is taken in order to keep in step with the status quo. 
Many people with good intentions developed schools for African-Americans. 
Woodson notes that these schools were crafted out of “enthusiasm” as opposed to 
“knowledge”. It is the sentiment of Woodson that such schools were for the 
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“transformation” of African-Americans, not “development”. These words are useful in 
that they disclose a particular mission of imposition in contrast to building for the 
possibility of contribution. The assumption was that all former slaves needed were the 
same information and opportunity to learn as their white counterparts and all would be 
equal and equitable. This of course was not the case. First, blacks were not seen as equals 
to whites. Second, education alone would not be enough to guarantee opportunity in the 
marketplace amongst individuals operating in a system during the very years blacks 
worked as slaves. Third, some of the areas taught were not congruent with the experience 
of blacks of this time or well into Woodson’s time. Last, the “enthusiastic” philanthropist 
and progressive thinkers developing schools did not think of the impact of such factors as 
racism, hard feelings, and lack of respect toward their newfound contemporaries that 
were once held as property. Failure to think through these problems for the best course of 
action caused a “regime of oppression” and a unilateral focus in the education of African-
Americans resulting in mis-education. 
 The results of mis-education are further proliferated through what children hear. 
In this case the phenomenon of a child being told by a parent is used as an example.7 As 
an educator I have heard parents declare that they were “never good in math” and can 
understand why their children are not as well. A critique of these conversations is put 
forward by Woodson as a learned reaction from “their oppressors”. 
 
7 One might also recall the incident of Malcolm X (then Malcolm Little) being told by a teacher that a lawyer was not a 
suitable occupation for someone of his skin color (my words and emphasis) (X, 1993, p. 36). 
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Histories written elsewhere for the former slave area were discarded, and new 
treatments of local and national history in conformity with the recrudescent 
propaganda were produced to give whites and blacks the biased point of view of 
the development of the nation and the relations of the races. (Woodson, 
1933/2004, p. 85) 
 
 
 Woodson as a scholar has written extensively on the history of African, African-
Americans, and people of color in general. His purpose is to bring awareness through his 
literature and through such events as Negro History Week.8 There is a stern critique in 
Woodson’s text that one of the key components to mis-education is the lack of culturally 
specific history. Woodson cites lack of emphasis on African philosophy, African 
accomplishments, and a general disdain for historical achievements by people of color as 
points where the “regime of the oppressor” are readily seen. Lack of emphasis on 
historical contributions is a key “how” in Woodson’s mis-education for the simple fact 
that he based most of his academic career on the study, publishing, and advocacy of these 
contributions so that young African-Americans might know about them.  
Why does Mis-Education Happen? 
Individuals that develop education for blacks, though enthusiastic, perhaps fail to 
consider where the African-Americans would contribute best in society. Instead, African-
Americans were given the same type of information, skills, and expectations of other 
groups already occupying a particular position in American society. The assumption was, 
as indicated by Woodson, teaching the skills that everyone else has will guarantee a spot 
for the African-American man or woman to be a “duly qualified” citizen. This of course 
8 This later became Black History Month. 
20 
 
                                                          
was not the case and, in Woodson’s view, both black and white suffered for this failure of 
vision. 
 
Negroes have no control over their education and have little voice in their other 
affairs pertaining thereto… education of the Negroes…is almost entirely in the 
hands of those who have enslaved them and now segregate them. (Woodson, 
1933/2004, p. 22) 
 
 
In answering, “why mis-education”, we could look at Woodson’s quote above and 
see some very key elements to the pervasive nature of mis-education in 1933 and today. 
The concept of control over curricular materials is a key component. It is the final say so 
on issues of educational importance that are instrumental to combating the processes of 
mis-education on African-American minds. In Woodson’s day, issues surrounding the 
education of blacks were made by individuals who were responsible for segregating 
African-Americans. Today, school boards and governments at varying levels do not 
segregate children, but often make decisions while well-distanced from the actual 
problems needing to be addressed. 
 A component of why mis-education occurs is seen in Woodson’s (1933/2004) 
account of “lack of confidence” (pp.108-109). This lack of confidence leads to a type of 
inferiority complex mentioned in Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks. This 
confidence, or lack thereof, filters into what an African-American sees within his or 
herself and has a bearing on potential.9 This confidence when read more deeply within 
the text, actually corresponds to how others are viewed. For instance, a black leader may 
not be seen as competent or impactful as a white leader in the same position. For this 
9 Woodson says possibilities. 
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reason, lack of confidence is a component of why mis-education continues eighty years 
after Woodson published his book. It is important for all people to have a positive 
viewpoint and sincere confidence in their cultural identity. The contrasting result of not 
having such confidence is a lack of trust resulting in failed relationships, time, and 
productivity. 
 
It is an injustice to the Negro, however, to mis-educate him and suffer his 
manners to be corrupted from infancy unto old age and then blame him for 
making the mistakes which such guidance necessitates. (Woodson, 1933/2004, p. 
125) 
 
 
 Woodson speaks to the restriction and condescension of African-Americans and 
its end in delinquency, uncontrolled passions, and degeneration in various areas. Perhaps 
Woodson saw something in 1933 that we should have adhered to as a country. Yet, his 
words apparently fell upon deaf ears over these eighty years. Today we see the effects of 
such mis-education in our African-American males. Woodson posits that this occurs not 
because they are inferior, susceptible to beastlike passions, or are genetically 
predisposed; but because of a system that “mis-educates” by allowing “manners to be 
corrupted”. It is reminiscent of a proverb which states “poor conversation corrupts good 
manners.” This has never been truer than in the situation we see today as we are 
witnessing large-scale incarceration of African-American males and American citizens in 
general. 
 The final aspect of “why mis-education” is the component of expecting a 
reproduction or imitation of what has already been done in society. A true education in 
teaching of the accomplishments of times past will, in Woodson’s words, “imbibe” youth 
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with the “spirit” of great men and women. An education must present a call of duty that 
the “vision and invention” of times past are within reach and accessible to create new 
things, new realities, and new ways of living together. 
Effects of Mis-education: Impacts in Education, Employment, Politics, and Service 
Of all demographics currently populating U.S. schools, African-American males 
seem to fare the worst amongst their peers. African-American males have lower literacy 
rates, higher drop-out rates, poorer math and reading scores, more likely to be placed in 
special education classes, and are less likely to attend and graduate from a four-year 
college or university. These areas should prompt a call for a national epidemic and 
immediate response to resolve the problem. But, time has only showcased a worsening 
trend for African-American males in public educational spaces. W.E. B. DuBois stated 
that the problem of the 20th century was the problem of the color line. Our 21st century 
now introduces the color line anew in the spheres of education. More access to education 
has meant more of a need to perform at levels commensurate with the opportunities 
given. However, African-American males have not adequately stepped into these 
opportunities and grasped them accordingly.  
The education of African-American males can be said to be inadequate as it 
currently sits. We cannot call such a practice of education as has been handed to African-
American males a “proper education.” Carter G. Woodson would appropriate the term 
mis-education here. Mis-education is when someone is afforded the opportunities 
distinctive to an educational setting, but fails to receive the benefit of such a setting. For 
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African-American males educational settings this failure is exhibited in the lack of 
success in comparison to their counterparts of other races. 
Mis-education from a phenomenological perspective is not something that is 
practiced, learned, or handed down as a legacy from generation to generation, though it 
would appear that way. It is an experience that over time can evolve into a practice, a 
system of learning and a legacy of a particular group. African-Americans in education are 
plagued by a psyche of injustice. The problems of mis-education begin and are 
precipitated in the psyche. A consciousness emerges that allows for the “back-door” 
hypothesis to take form in time and space. Woodson’s concept of a man (or woman) 
being controlled is trumped in his own quote by the acceptance of this metaphorical back-
door. This back-door is “crafted” for “one’s own special use” (Woodson, 1933/2004). 
What are the tools of such crafting and how does someone know how to assemble the 
“door”? Woodson posits that the “education” deems it so. 
Woodson emphatically states again and again that African-Americans (Negroes) 
are being taught a body of information that in practice becomes no more than material for 
imitation. African-Americans learn little about their history and contributions to society 
past and present. The creation of such a history deems the African-American to think 
their history is non-existent or consistent of a barbaric, unlearned class of people. Seeing 
no past successes like those of the European, African history is relegated to a whisper of 
what it truly is in reality. Woodson takes considerable time developing this component of 
his work, expressing that elevation of other cultures at the expense of one’s own is 
damaging and has the recipient of such an education looking elsewhere for an identity. 
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This identity, linked with mis-education is found through individuals not seeking to 
educate, but rather to control. 
Before it appears that this paper simply seeks to demonize current ways of 
educating without merit let’s pause to discuss what has been attempted in the education 
of African-Americans. We must begin with the accounts of “Negroes” during slavery. 
Cut off from education, people of African descent and the slave culture that they 
inhabited for years in the U.S., sought to educate themselves by autodidactism (self-
teaching). This self-teaching consisted of hiding the fact of being educated and displaying 
a presumed innocence. Some were afforded education by generous masters and 
abolitionist groups. Yet, education for the most part was a clandestine practice. 
Fast forward to the twentieth century, African-Americans endure severe injustices 
in the forms of lynching, disenfranchisement, and Jim Crow de facto and de jure 
legislation. However, many African-American populations had begun an extensive 
program of educating their children. Common schools arose to circumvent the previous 
lack of access to education. Some even attempted to posture their children amongst 
whites and were met with opposition. As time elapsed legislation was imposed to insure 
the distance between African-Americans and whites exclusive. Plessy versus Ferguson is 
one such case that brought such a separation. By the 1950’s Brown versus Board of 
Education would overturn this legislation using the defense that separate but equal was 
separate but unequal and the ramifications of such separation was “psychologically 
damaging.” 
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Even though a decision had been handed down from the United States Supreme 
Court, the implementation of Brown vs. Board was not actualized in its “all deliberate 
speed” until funding for state programs was of consequence for not desegregating 
schools. This use of federal funding as a proverbial carrot would be used again and again 
to provoke implementation of laws affecting education. Our most modern conceptions of 
this is the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) and the most recent Race to the Top 
Initiative (RttT). NCLB was meant to assist minorities in education by insuring highly-
qualified teachers and standards being met for the teaching and learning of school-aged 
children. The resultant activity of the act was a disaggregating of school data that 
showcased the extent of the rift between children of color and their collective 
counterparts. Today, the RttT initiative has been a means of implementing educational 
reform without the full responsibility of funding state budgets. States were encouraged to 
apply for additional funding that was in limited supply. The result of this initiative was a 
larger allotment of charter schools and significant changes to the paradigm of education, 
including the implementation of common core standards. 
Educational reform models abound in the short time since Woodson’s text. 
However, few, African-American or otherwise, have looked into the consciousness of the 
individual that has been mis-educated. The Brown vs. Board case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court appeared to be a start, yet the argument of being “psychologically 
damaging” appears to be a buzzword for historical buffs. What does it mean to be 
“psychologically damaged”? How were Thurgood Marshall and his team of NAACP 
lawyers so assured that this was the case? It is my belief that Woodson was on to the root 
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of the problem in mis-education. The problem of education or better mis-education is the 
phenomenon that arises in the consciousness of the individual. The concept of how they 
see themselves as members of an identifiable culture and society as a whole. This concept 
in relation to schooling is often linked to a performance based paradigm that begins with 
scholastic attainment in educational settings. 
Linguist John McWhorter (2000) states that “almost forty years after the Civil 
Rights Act, African-American students on the average are measuring to be the weakest in 
the United States, at all ages, in all subjects, and regardless of class level”  in academic 
endeavors (p. 82). In order to illustrate his point, McWhorter showcases the realities of 
the problem through SAT scores, the possible myths of why there are performance 
disparities, and cultural disconnect between African-American students and their school 
learning experiences. A study conducted by William G. Bowen and Derek Bok from 
twenty-eight selective universities between 1981 and 1995 found that three-fourths of 
white students scored 1200 out of 1600 on the SAT compared to only one-fourth of their 
African-American counterparts (McWhorter, 2000, p. 85). Showing that the argument for 
class was insufficient, the mean score for African-Americans in 1995 from families 
making $50,000 or more was 849 out of 1600, the mean score for white students from 
families earning $10,000 or less (McWhorter, 2000, p. 85).  
Examining the validity of the SAT in gauging performance in college and 
university programs, it has been found that the test does correlate well with college grade 
point average over four years for blacks and whites (McWhorter, 2000, p. 86). The 
excuses abound for why such numbers appear in scholarly works. Is it the validity of the 
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test, bias in questions, or a need for testing multiple intelligences a la Howard Gardner? I 
raise these numbers in order to look at this phenomenon more intently and perhaps get to 
the root of this apparent weakness in African-American scholarship.  
Regardless of our agreement with the cause of dismal SAT scores amongst 
disaggregated peer groups and poor academic performance in school overall, we must 
admit that there is some problem occurring amongst our African-American students. 
Often this problem is showcased in low expectations, classroom attitudes, and even 
teasing by individuals within the African-American peer group (Delpit, 2012; 
McWhorter, 2000). I would like to submit to the reader that this phenomenon fits within 
the work of Dr. Carter G. Woodson and is what he listed eighty years ago as, “The Mis-
education of the Negro”. 
Employment 
Inefficient education has a direct bearing on ones employment opportunities. 
Further, training for a particular skill-set is deemed useless if it is outdated or inaccessible 
to the person or people so trained. Woodson makes this case very poignantly in his text. 
Mis-education as a general definition could mean inappropriately educated or trained. An 
education should afford someone with skills that span past the rigors of a school. 
Education should bring about the tools necessary to, in Woodson’s words, “make a 
living”. The building blocks for “a living” are therefore the educational frameworks 
established as a consequence of training and learning. However, once again African-
Americans appear to be lacking in this vital component of personal and collective 
economy. 
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The recent sub-prime mortgage housing bubble disclosed some intense statistics 
within our country. After the collapse of the markets that brought about the “Great 
Recession”, the face of unemployment began to emerge amongst all cultures and creeds. 
Yet, one face seemed to be more prevalent amongst the bunch. African-American males 
have the highest current unemployment rate in the nation. Currently, African-Americans, 
per 2010 census data, consist of approximately 13% of the U.S. population. African-
American males consist of 6% of the total U.S. population. Of this 6%, it has been 
estimated that one-third will be somehow entangled in the United States Judicial system 
negatively in some way. Examples include prison, parole, probation, house arrest, jail and 
so on. If these facts are correct, the high numbers of unemployment are attributable to 
many factors that have little to do with training for a job. The extent of the problem is 
more than reading, writing and arithmetic and spills over into areas of domestic life, 
choices and most important issues of identity.  
Employment in America is often an issue of identity. Introductions often include 
descriptors of where one works and how long they have worked there. These identifiers 
often characterize the “living” we speak of in the words “means to make a living”. The 
expenditures of life are dictated by identity. The question becomes how has this identity 
been altered or made to believe in a reality in which a “back-door” mentality is a 
necessity? The simple answer to this query is the “mis-education of the negro”. 
In order to look at the parallel of the mis-education of African-Americans and 
employment, I would like to first look at what education should look like and then make 
the juxtaposition with mis-education. Education includes a purpose, a curriculum to 
29 
 
fulfill that purpose and people and tools to implement the curriculum. These are the 
essentials of education, but not education itself. Education is education when the 
purposes, curriculum, people and tools all coincide to build up an individual. If mis-
education is an inappropriate rendering of education I would like to presuppose that mis-
education too has a purpose, curriculum, people and tools for implementation. The 
question in mis-education is not that there are these elements, but how the elements are 
compounded. In order to answer that aspect of this inquiry, further examination must be 
made as to what constitutes the purpose, curriculum, people and tools of the practice. 
The question of the purposes, curricular structure, people and tools of the practice 
of mis-education distills into questions of why and who benefits from such activity. 
Control of thinking, according to Woodson, is the sole motivating purpose of mis-
education. In order to control, any curriculum must follow the principles of this 
controlling paradigm. This control is not a mere establishment of parameters for the mis-
educated to sit themselves in, but a systematic stripping of the capacity to think. We are 
most mis-educated when we fail to think for ourselves. All of us feel that we practice 
natural, unmitigated, unfettered thought in our identities, but the framework offered by 
mis-education is similar to that of the tyrant of Plato’s Republic. The tyrant is at their best 
when a sense of normalcy can be established. As long as the mis-educated sees their state 
as a place of normal operation then the reality of Woodson’s back-door hypothesis will 
follow as prescribed. Therefore, the curriculum appears to be a normal one. Complete 
with reading, mathematics, science, history, English, physical education and foreign 
language. However, as Woodson would attest, these “normal” categories cover a more 
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clandestine and shrinking propensity to belittle otherness. African-Americans are not told 
of contributions of African peoples in mathematics for example. Or the myriad inventions 
from African and African-American scientists are not discussed even though a significant 
amount of current technology is based upon or directly invented by people of African 
descent. The same can be said of cultures other than African-Americans. Contributions 
and connections of other groups are relegated to asides or special cases in history since 
the curriculum is based on the dominant culture as defined by an oppressive regime. 
This dynamic translates into the people and tools being used to implement the 
curriculum which fails to acknowledge any that do not look like the perceived culture of 
dominance. Lisa Delpit would call such a culture of dominance the culture of power. This 
culture of power defines for the other what the norms and mores should be in this reality. 
The people, who could be teachers, administrators, stakeholders or a peer group, work 
with the tools of mis-education in order to be agents either knowingly or unknowingly for 
the alignment to the purposes of dominating or controlling the group in question. 
In terms of employment, a nihilistic view of societal structure emerges. What is 
the purpose of employment? In Woodson’s words it would be to make a living. However, 
if I am unable to secure employment, am I then seen as unfit to live? Many African-
Americans would say that suicide is not a realistic response to Africana nihilism in this 
framework, however, statistics on African-American male suicide rates posit this 
demographic as a fast growing group. Aside from literal, instantaneous suicide, there is 
the slow death of debilitating habits. Sigmund Freud would have quite an interesting 
study of the African-American today due to the various issues of preventable health 
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maladies such as heart disease, high blood pressure, type-2 diabetes, atherosclerosis, 
obesity, HIV/AIDS, and high levels of stress for example. Add to this list the introduction 
of crack cocaine and various other drugs into predominantly African-American 
communities and there is a potential case for nihilism amongst this group. The education 
afforded the mis-educated has also given this group the wherewithal to endure the death 
drive embedding an eros which seeks to create in the beautiful façade created by the 
purposes, people and tools of mis-educative experience. Ultimately, the dilemma of 
employment today is still a predetermined phenomenon impacting the reality of African-
Americans and subsequently their capacity to live. 
Perhaps the largest hindrance to employment in African-American communities is 
the issue of mass incarceration. Recently, Attorney General Eric Holder called for a 
review of our current system of mandatory sentencing of minor drug offenses. Holder 
states in an article posted in the Guardian that, “The US accounts for 25% of the world's 
prison numbers, even though it has only 5% of the world's population. Drug-related 
offences drive the vast majority of this, and people convicted of conspiring to sell 5kg of 
cocaine will currently receive a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence.” (Roberts, 2013) 
Holder’s comment for blacks in the U.S. is of importance since the highest rate for 
dropouts in our country is African-American males. About half of our African-American 
boys who enter high school as freshman do not finish in four years (Noguera, 2003; 
Alexander, 2012). This means that they are more likely to dropout and are more 
susceptible to criminal activities leading to incarceration, probation, or parole 
(Alexander, 2012). Michelle Alexander (2012) states that a Human Rights Watch report 
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from 2000 reported “African-Americans constitute 80 to 90 percent of all drug offenders 
sent to prison” (p. 98). I can respect Attorney General Holder’s move to posture the drug 
problem differently, but in reviewing the problem we see the factors involved are more 
than a disproportionate amount of African-Americans getting caught, a predilection to 
drug use, poverty, or a reckless abandon to commit crime in the form of illegal drug 
sales. Alexander (2012) notes that drug markets here in America, “reflect our nation’s 
racial and socioeconomic boundaries; whites sell to whites, blacks sell to blacks” (pp. 
100-101). The same can be said of other types of crime. The biggest killer of blacks is 
blacks. We can simply recall the Bureau of Justice Statistics from the U.S. Department of 
Justice (Harrell, 2007). If these points are the facts in black and white, why are there 
disproportionate numbers and better still, why have African-Americans not been 
equipped to overcome them?  
The issue in employment may be a type of oppression identified by Woodson 
eighty years ago. We are hard-pressed not to see negative images of any race, including 
whites, were derogatory images of how we are or appear to be in society comes to light. 
However, Woodson’s concern is not that we are exposed to such an “educational process, 
but that we are not educated otherwise.  
 Woodson further elucidates the interconnection of mis-education and employment 
in another quote in the first chapter of his text. He states that upon completion of his or 
her education the “Negro” is “equipped to begin the life of an Americanized or 
Europeanized white man (Woodson, 1993/2004).” The problem with this is that an 
African-American man or woman is simply not a white man neither can they pretend to 
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be. Though prepared to work in the same areas of expertise as an Americanized or 
Europeanized white man, in areas of limited diversity there is also a limited chance of 
employment. Our current figures on employment, unemployment and underemployment 
for African-Americans may show this prescient statement of Dr. Woodson to be true 
indeed. As of August 2, 2013, the Department of Labor Statistics reported that while the 
11.5 million unemployed in our country totaled 7.4 percent, African-Americans had an 
unemployment rate of 12.6 percent. The only other group with a higher unemployment 
rate in the disaggregated data was teenagers at 23.7 percent. 
Political Education 
A political education should consist of an understanding of a just society in the 
organized, structured parameters of our time. A political education in Woodson’s 
rendering of the practice would immerse African-Americans in the activity of politics 
beyond the rhetoric and schemes often synonymous with campaigns in their attempts to 
secure the vote. Woodson would argue today that citizens in general and African-
Americans in particular are too easily persuaded by non-essential information. The words 
of Woodson seem to echo in our time that African-Americans should understand the 
historical and domestic factors that have established our system and how this system has 
been used for the causes of some at the expense of others. Such understanding moves far 
beyond speeches and campaign stops and emerges into an understanding of how such 
structures work and how they should work for and toward the individual. 
Woodson makes a pointed effort in The Mis-education of the Negro to showcase 
the ineptitude of some African-Americans to fully grasp the implications of politics. He 
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points toward a denied proposal to have the U.S. Constitution printed and distributed to 
students in schools. This denial, he states, comes from a need to not disclose that the 
power of government is derived exclusively by those governed. Here again Woodson is 
quoted in terms of the phenomenon of “[controlling] a man’s thinking”. Instead of 
controlling, Woodson uses the word ‘determine’. The determinism of insufficient 
political education in Woodson’s scholarship has the ability to turn a free man into a 
slave and slave to an emancipated contributor to a society. The former has arisen as a 
consequence of mis-education. It is the product of a structured system of divulging the 
information one group would like another to know. Woodson makes a strong case 
throughout his text for the necessity of an individual to create and cultivate for 
themselves. The result of this creation and cultivation is determinism of a slave to be a 
free, the reality Woodson hoped to see instead of the observations noted within his 1933 
text. 
 Utilizing Woodson’s view of political education, we see that he believed in the 
activity of learning, not just the acquisition of facts and figures to call knowledge. The 
tone of Woodson’s words speaks to the fact that he feels very intently that in order for 
African-Americans of his day to be citizens they must be active ones. Maxine Greene 
(1988) speaks of this phenomenon beautifully when she states that freedom [is] 
“developed by human beings who have acted to make a space for themselves in the 
presence of others…for those willing to take responsibility for themselves and for each 
other” (p. 56).  This is to say that there must be an active participation in the political 
structure for such a freedom and responsibility to occur. Rereading Greene’s work I came 
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across another great quote that elucidates the sentiment of Woodson. She states that “in 
order to find or create an authentic public space, that is, one in which diverse human 
beings can appear before one another as, to quote Hannah Arendt, “the best they know 
how to be (Greene, 1988).” The “best they know how to be”, not what they want to be or 
appear to be, there must be knowledge of this reality. Woodson felt that such knowledge 
needed, in similitude with Greene, that “authentic public space.” It is interesting to note 
that Woodson sentiment is not just for the benefit of African-Americans, but for the 
overall citizenry. 
Looking at Woodson’s take on political education we notice that this education 
has a historical bend to it. It is the ability of the once oppressed “Negro” to look back that 
is their greatest asset. He states that in terms of history, it has shown that African-
Americans easily [learn] to follow the line of least resistance rather than battle against 
odds for what real history has shown to be the right course (Woodson, 1933/2006). On 
those rare occasions when African-Americans have chosen the “tough” path great strides 
were made. One can simply take into account the Civil Rights Movement and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the monumental Brown versus Topeka Board of Education 
Supreme Court case of 1954. In both pieces of legislation African-Americans played vital 
parts in their being heard and accepted in the public consciousness. If we are to take 
Woodson’s words to heart for our day in terms of political education, we must sincerely 
ask if we have a society where those that are most oppressed and subjugated have a voice 
in our system of political freedom. An honest assessment of such freedoms would show 
very emphatically that few are involved in the activity of politics and those coming 
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behind us to take our places are not in a state of preparation as in Woodson’s (1933/2004) 
words they do not have a clear conception of the “present status of the race or sufficient 
foresight to plan for the future; and [drift] so far toward compromise that [they] lose 
moral courage (p. 96).” Therefore, this mis-education becomes a “perfect device for 
control from without (Woodson, 1933/2004, p. 96).” 
Service 
Woodson lends significant time to the topic of servanthood in his text on mis-
education. This apportioning begs the question of why are the qualities of service so 
important to overcoming mis-education? Again to unveil the phenomenon as Woodson 
disclosed it, it is necessary to uncover his words on the topic. One first point of 
exploration appears in Woodson’s chapter on the need for service rather than leadership. 
In examining this chapter I would like to answer why he saw a need for service rather 
than leadership, what this need entails for overcoming mis-education, and what 
preventative measures may have been suggested to avoid falling short in this area in the 
future. 
Why Service Over Leadership 
Woodson’s chapter on service rather than leadership can be summed up in the 
word impact. He would like to see more of an impact made in serving the people that 
leadership represents. Service to a group does not require the position of leadership, 
simply willingness to attend to the needs of another. Woodson points out position filled 
by African-Americans that only serves as an “earmarked…Jim Crow job” that is “set 
aside for…a [worker] of a campaign”. This service to a campaign lends itself to a new 
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position of “leadership”, but yields no new horizons for the people that the campaign had 
said it would represent. Woodson simply states that there is a need here for an individual 
to serve as opposed to merely filling a position of leadership without the exclusive 
responsibility of those you are leading. 
Overcoming Mis-education With Service 
Service to a community can take on a myriad of forms, but for the most part 
service entails meeting many of the immediate needs of a community. This meeting of 
needs is necessary in overcoming the obstacles that prevent the access of the group to be 
served. This is not a mere handing of resources, but a shared cultivation. One of the 
words used by Woodson in this part of his text is exploitation. Since the service implies a 
shared cultivation of the desired outcomes of a community and its people, exploitation 
isn’t a product of the server and served. Mis-education can be overcome in this type of 
interchange since there is a vested interest in the outcomes of a served community. 
Preventing Mis-education With Service 
According to Woodson, “the race needs workers, not leaders.” He sees the 
preventative agent as the service itself. The question of work to Woodson should be a 
guide concerning if someone is to be trusted in the speeches he or she presents. Woodson 
states that we should “inquire” what the person speaking “is doing” has “done for 
humanity”10. With this in view we can prevent mis-education since service is a means by 
10 Woodson, 1933/2004 
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which we “may prove sufficient…the task of self-development and contribute…to 
modern culture.”11  
Harsh critiques of the NAACP, African-American intellectuals, African-
American leaders and activist, and even historically black colleges and universities 
(HBCU’s) fell under the scrutiny of lacking impact.12 Funny as it may sound, Woodson 
actually spoke of this in his comments on service, or its lack, to African-American 
communities by African-Americans in particular. 
Reiterating that Woodson believed that education in schools of his day “equipped 
[African-Americans] to begin life as an Americanized and Europeanized man”, we might 
say that such an education also taught a disdain for serving the community in some way. 
Woodson (1933/2004) has a harsh indictment for the intellectual and states such things 
as, “men who have the doctorate…lose touch with the common people,” and that what 
they are “being taught does not bring their minds into harmony with life as they must face 
it” (p. 35).  Lack of service to community is the key reason for why Woodson would 
think such things to be true in 1933, however, hasn’t such a situation changed in light of 
programs like service-learning? 
Service learning has been incorporate by at least one-third of all public schools 
(National Center of Education Statistics, 2013). The practice of service learning is seen as 
important since it provides opportunities for students to learn important academic skills 
and supports the civic mission of schools (Billig, 2002). In a study of the efficacy of 
service learning, Shelley Billig (2000) notes that service learning can increase students’ 
11 Ibid 
12 I recall one of my colleagues, an educator and historian, stating how the Civil Rights Movement was averted by 
offering many of the activists’ tenured positions at universities or coffers of money for speaking. 
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ability to learn complex subject matter, decrease their involvement in risky behaviors, 
and encourage them to form bonds with adult role models other than teachers and parents 
(p. xx). In a summary report by Alan Melchior (1999), service learning showed many 
positive benefits including improved grades in particular subjects, greater sense of 
cultural diversity, and awareness of community needs (p. xx). With the positive feedback, 
what could be the problem with a service learning curriculum? 
 Answering the question of what could be wrong with a service learning 
curriculum will be accomplished here to address the concept of Woodson’s service in 
contrast with what is being offered by schools instead. First, I would like to submit that 
the concept of service learning is a requirement of schools not a voluntary action of the 
student. It would be interesting to see if the involuntary portion of this program were 
taken away how many students would continue to go across cultures or even into their 
own communities to offer their “service”. Second, this forced framework mirrors a type 
of community service where a certain number of hours must be secured before a 
requirement is met (Mitchell, 2008). This causes many, not all, service learning programs 
to lose the impact of altruism, cross-cultural connectivity, and awareness seen in some of 
the earlier literature presented. Third, though effective in engaging students actively in 
service, the learning portion is often lost due to no critical reflection on the activities and 
how the activities served the community (Mitchell, 2008). It would be interesting to see 
how many students continue to serve or create outlets where community needs can be 
met as a consequence of their experience with addressing a community need. Such 
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service is most likely not what Dr. Woodson had in mind when he critiqued education in 
his day. I believe that Woodson would still see some need for work in this area today.  
Conclusion 
Carter G. Woodson died in 1950, leaving a rich legacy of scholarship in Africana 
studies. This essay is not only a credit to his text and life, but an examination to honor 
this great forefather of Africana scholarship. We show true honor and respect of an 
individual in their absence. It would be very easy to attend a conference or panel 
discussion focusing on Woodson with him as the keynote speaker. Yet, such a conference 
or panel will not occur as we are only left with his text to decipher how he would like to 
contribute in our time. Mis-education embellishes forever the historical consciousness of 
African-Americans that when you control or determine the thinking of an individual you 
don’t have to worry about their actions. Woodson speaks clearly today in every arena in 
which the conscious activity of African-Americans is compromised by consumption of 
frivolous pursuits and lack of vision. His words are a strong indictment against our lack 
of service to our society at large and to one another in particular. As in Woodson’s time, 
it also is now. Our capacity to serve one another coupled with a sincere drive to secure a 
consciousness grounded and based in the fundamental understanding of who we are as a 
people is essential. The contribution of Woodson sought to reconnect African-Americans 
to the elements of our reality that imparted the most strength, our collective 
consciousness of the ability to overcome together in community. It is the responsibility of 
all who value the legacy of Dr. Carter G. Woodson to follow through with the 
suggestions of his text.  
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Therefore, in response to the question of how does Africana theory, philosophy 
and pedagogy address the challenges posed by Woodson text? I would say that Africana 
scholarship has done a significant job in disclosing and opening dialogue consistent in 
addressing the areas of concern in Woodson’s text (history of African-Americans, the 
collective consciousness of African-American, and the contribution throughout time of 
African-Americans). More work must be done in a spirit of service, but the emphasis of 
Africana studies is a beginning to fully addressing the “mis-education of the Negro”.  
In response to how is it that Dr. Woodson’s text is still relevant in the education 
and general experiences of African-American today? The relevance of Woodson is 
showcased in our dismal graduation rates for African-American males and higher than 
average admittance of African-American males into special education programs. This 
study does not focus on the phenomenon of diagnoses that may impact educational 
performance such as attention-deficit disorder or attention-deficit, hyperactive disorder, 
which often require medication that can potentially hinder mood and academic 
performance. I, therefore, posit this point as a place for further study. 
For the questions concerning the endurance of Woodson’s “back-door” in the 
education of African-Americans and African-American males in particular and the 
solution to the issue of Woodson’s back-door hypothesis, I will say that the arena that has 
not been explored deeply is the consciousness of African-Americans in relation to this 
phenomenon. We study cases of addiction noting brain activity; we can pinpoint areas of 
development for infants and children, but have not fully explored the effects of the 
consciousness in poor school performance. I ascribe fully to Woodson’s suggestion that a 
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child that comes to school ill-prepared should be a focus of study and not reprimanded. 
For clarification, that does not mean that we not hold students accountable, but that we 
treat in Woodson’s (1933/2004) words the “disease and not the symptom(s)” (p. 145). 
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CHAPTER III 
MASKS, VEILS, AND INVISIBLE PEOPLE: A PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
 
 DUBOISIAN DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 
If a poor self-concept is all that there is to mis-education then all a child would 
need is some intensive therapy and mental exercises to free themselves from the plight. 
The concept of the individual for African-American consciousness is perhaps more than 
just a Cartesian cogito ergo sum. In Africana philosophy, for example, the cogito is met 
with a where, a location. Not just that I think and I am, but I am positioned somewhere. 
Herein is the differentiation of Continental and Africana philosophy. Africana philosophy 
is concerned with the positionality of the I and therefore has an added dimension to its 
scope. The Africana tradition links this back to African philosophy, but more familiarly 
attributed to the person of W. E. B. DuBois, a contemporary of Woodson.  
W. E. B. DuBois was educated at Harvard University in philosophy under 
American pragmatist William James. In pragmatic fashion, James advised DuBois to use 
his “tools” where they would best help people of African descent. DuBois’s works is thus 
a conglomerate of sociological, theoretical, anthropological and philosophical scope. His 
book, The Souls of Black Folk, best explains the phenomenon of an African-American 
consciousness in regards to the Africana conception of time and space. The Souls of 
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Black Folk is a movement through the consciousness of DuBois individually and 
collectively through the consciousness of “Black folk”. This movement spans the spaces 
of history, jazz, the blues, grief and racism. Fulfilling the spaces defined by African-
American experience is determined in DuBois’s words by a “second sight”. The veiled 
existence defined by DuBois is a construction meant to define the exigencies of African-
American consciousness. The definitive need to be coupled with the reality of a presumed 
existence brings the ontological construction of a double consciousness. DuBois’s double 
consciousness bridges the gap between Woodson’s race concept and the experiential 
aspect of mis-education. Double consciousness entails a dual identity, a double self. The 
individual is a subject, an I as well as an object, a body. The body is always seen, but the 
subject the I often is left unnoticed. Therefore the struggle for expression as an I in the 
body of objectivity ensues. As such a struggle occurs in the development of such 
consciousness, information that does not validate and secure identity formation becomes 
damaging as the I seeks to form into the information it sees as relevant. If no such 
information is provided the gaps in ones reality is fused together with the fantasy of 
another, that is what an “objective” presupposes another’s being to mean. This is 
Woodson’s mis-education and the double consciousness of DuBois. The effects in this 
paradigm on education become monumental and “damaging” in their scope. 
DuBois describes that the African-American in his seminal work The Souls of 
Black Folk off-sets this damage through a process of veiling. His work is reminiscent of 
my youth in which if given the choice of a superpower, I would always choose the power 
to be invisible. I always think of this when reading the first few pages of DuBois’s work 
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and wanted to explore it further. Why would I, an African-American male, want to be 
invisible? Better yet, why would DuBois describe a whole group of people in a social, 
interactive world as have a veil? 
This essay explores the phenomenon of a veil or mask as described in DuBois’s 
work. Using veil and mask or making interchangeably, I seek to disclose the concept of 
the phenomenon of DuBois’s double consciousness and the inborn veil of the African-
American as described in his work, The Souls of Black Folk. 
Introducing DuBois 
 
 
I have sought here to sketch, in vague, uncertain outline, the spiritual world in 
which ten thousand thousand Americans live and strive…I have strived to show 
what Emancipation meant to them, and what was its aftermath…I have pointed 
out the slow rise of personal leadership, and criticized candidly the leader who 
bears the chief burden of his race to-day…I have sketched in swift outline the two 
worlds within and without the Veil, and thus have come to the central problem of 
training men for life…I have…studied the struggles of the massed millions of the 
black peasantry, and…sought to make clear the present relation of sons of master 
and man. (DuBois, 1995, p. 41) 
 
 
DuBois writes after his prefatory comments on the text The Souls of Black Folk 
that he has “stepped within the Veil” and raised it that we the readers of his work may 
“view faintly its deeper recesses.” He discloses these recesses to be religion, passion of 
human sorrow, and the struggle of its greater souls (DuBois, 1995). The intriguing aspect 
of his words is that he concludes this forethought with the statement that these elements 
he reveals are a “tale twice told, but seldom written” (DuBois, 1995). What does DuBois 
mean by this statement? How are we to define this Veil and its semiotic nature in the 
lives of Black folk? 
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In order to answer these questions I would like to engage in a philosophical 
inquiry to examine the meaning of W.E.B. DuBois’s depiction of the Veil and, more 
specifically, double consciousness. This examination will link DuBois with a 
philosophical tradition from his training under William James and find its voice fully in 
the enduring words of DuBois through the modern Africana philosophical tradition. This 
study will engage the philosophical inquiry with pragmatic and post-colonial frameworks 
and a phenomenological methodology. The research questions for this study are what is 
the DuBoisian Veil of his work, The Souls of Black Folk? How do African-Americans 
come to wear this Veil in American society? How can an individual be doubly conscious 
at a particular moment? How do we define double consciousness in the experience of 
modern-day African-Americans?  
This study will conclude with an answer to the existence and necessity for double 
consciousness today in American society and how such a phenomenon may play out in 
our institutions of education, in politics, and interactions with others. For the sake of this 
study the terms used by DuBois (colored, Negro, black) and African-American will be 
used interchangeably in order to stay true to the words within his text where necessary. 
Sketching the Spiritual World of African-Americans 
DuBois begins his work with stating his vague attempt to sketch the spiritual 
world of “ten thousand thousands of Americans” (DuBois, 1995, p. 41). This statement 
declares to us a couple of things. First, that DuBois understands that there is a complexity 
in the spiritual life of individuals in particularly. Second, that he is only focusing his 
attention on a small, albeit substantial, portion of African-American spirituality. 
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Engaging this aspect of African-American experience DuBois introduces us to the 
concept of the Veil. The Veil from the Bible often speaks of Moses, an Old Testament 
prophet and lawgiver to Israel, and his nearness to God requiring him to wear a Veil to 
hide the glory (evidence of his experiences with God on a regular basis) that shown from 
his face.13 This Veil was a type of mask that made him relevant and able to relate, yet 
shielded him from the eyes of others. It is the Veil that is seen by others, but it is the 
person behind it that is expressed to others. The Veil therefore creates a duality that the 
wearer must live with in order to relate, but in so wearing it, masks the reality of who 
they are truly. DuBois chooses this as a starting point and prefaces his comments with the 
quote on the spiritual world of African-Americans. 
DuBois (1995) states that “the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and 
gifted with second-sight in this American world” (p. 45). This one sentence is loaded 
with meaning about the role or presence of African-Americans in DuBois’s time. For 
sake of the topic at hand my focus will be here on the Veil of DuBois’s statement. For 
DuBois, the Negro, the seventh son out of the cultures of the Earth at the time of his 
writing, is born with a veil. This veil grants the person it covers with “second-sight” in 
the “American world” that DuBois is apparently writing within. By second-sight DuBois 
is not speaking of double vision, because the tenor of his words denotes a clarity of sight 
not a hindrance to it. The DuBoisian veil is not mere skin color, since the veil appears to 
cover the senses, in particular the sense of sight. This sight is relegated by DuBois’s 
terminology to the American world. At the time of DuBois writing the American world 
13 Recall Biblical references in Exodus and 1 Corinthians pertaining to the veil of Moses. 
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had included a Declaration of Independence, a constitution, a Bill of Rights (though 
limited for a few Americans), and a historical and traditional identity steeped in a distinct 
and concentrated mis-treatment of African-Americans. So what does the veil look like 
upon its wearer? We understand that this veil is a metaphorical one, yet the wearer is 
cognizant that his or her full self remains unactualized behind it. Based upon DuBois’s 
forethought concerning a “sketch” of the “spiritual world” of African Americans, we 
understand this veil to consist within the inner life of the wearer. 
This inner life for the sake of this paper will be the I concept or the self in its 
perception of its identity of how it estimates itself to be in time and space and how it is 
viewed in time and space. A veil covers the self since to be both an American and a 
person of African descent you must be a distinct and separate entity from the two groups 
while still encompassing both. The veiled existence is a problematic one since in DuBois 
(1995) words a veiled existence “yields…no true self-consciousness” (p. 45). The lack of 
self-consciousness therefore makes for a view of the world which splits the consciousness 
between what it believes it is and what others view it to be. This is DuBois’s double 
consciousness. 
Double Consciousness: Two Worlds Within and Without the Veil 
 According to DuBois, there are two worlds, one within and one without the view.  
DuBois writes, 
 
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a 
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (Dubois, 1995, p. 45) 
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He calls double consciousness “a peculiar sensation” and a “sense of always looking at 
one’s self through the eyes of others” (DuBois, 1995). He further adds that it is the 
measuring of one’s soul by another’s tape. It is this metric of another which makes the 
double consciousness unique. While holding the view, the measure and the 
rationalization of another, what one feels they should be and the potential to fit betwixt 
the two, the individual of veiled, double consciousness. The problem of this gauge of 
someone else that further muddles this viewpoint is that this perception is not in praise 
and admiration of the individual, but one of “amused contempt and pity” (DuBois, 1995, 
p. 45).  
Defining Veilness 
On the campus of Tuskegee University there is a statue. The statue depicts the 
founder, Booker T. Washington, with left hand extended, holding a cloth over or 
apparently pulling a cloth or sheet from a partially veiled male with a large book in his 
hands. The statuesque Washington is fully clothed with a three-piece suit and shoes 
standing over the male figure with features of what can be characterized as “black”. The 
man, who is seated, has a book open and clutched toward his half-clothed body as if in 
the process of reading with his other hand on the veil. It is questionable whether this man 
is seeking to remove his covering or place it back where it once was. It is also a question 
that we might ask Washington about this veil. Whether veiling or unveiling the 
significance of this statue as it is experienced is where the phenomenon of our experience 
with it may occur. “Lifting the Veil”, a statue by artist Charles Keck, is erected in the 
heart of a predominantly African-American university in the South. Its focus can be said 
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to represent the education offered by its founder and might give some clue to the 
significance or common practice(s) of veiling and its link to education. This work seeks 
to explore the intentional presentation of a veil in the practice of education. 
The Presentation of a Veil 
The statue at Tuskegee University is interpreted in the work of Ralph Ellison as 
he explores an experience at an institution of learning through the eyes of his protagonist 
in Invisible Man. Ellison’s main character discloses the following about the erected 
monument: 
 
Then in my mind’s eye I see the bronze statue of the college Founder, the cold 
Father symbol, his hands outstretched in the breathtaking gesture of lifting a veil 
that flutters in hard, metallic folds above the face of a kneeling slave; and I am 
standing puzzled, unable to decide whether the veil is really being lifted, or 
lowered more firmly in place; whether I am witnessing a revelation or a more 
efficient blinding. (Ellison, 1990, p. 36, emphasis mine) 
 
 
Ellison’s character provides us with a question of the presentation of a veil. The 
background of an institution of higher learning might bring to mind images of students 
walking to class, talking on various subjects, the worry of one’s studies, thoughts of 
future successes or potential failure, or even the non-curricular elements of college and 
university life. Few, if any, probably look at this statue for inspiration or to the visage of 
the memorialized founder for fresh insight from the past. Whether students pass by or pay 
homage to the statue and its symbolism, the renown of Washington to not only found a 
school specifically for the cause of African-Americans, but to “unveil” them to the world 
as already in possession of some capacity of knowledge can possibly be represented by 
this monument. The veiled/unveiled man has in his possession a book and sits upon an 
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anvil and plow. He is under a cover, seated, and in possession all at once. Why then is 
there a need for a veil to be removed? Is this (un)veiling a natural part of the man’s 
existence? We might also consider that Washington is extending his hand as if offering a 
distant or present object or experience of which only the man and Washington has in 
view.  
Lifting the Veil 
In terms of the veil as a fixture in African-American experience, we have a 
description of its reality from W. E. B. DuBois. DuBois (1989) describes the African-
American as being “born with a veil” (p. 5). The DuBoisian veil is seen as a gift and a 
form of seeing. Here we might say that lifting such a veil would be a removal of such a 
gift and a blinding to one’s ability to see in this way in which you were born to view the 
world. We would see being born with a veil or cover upon our capacity to see as 
blindness or a cataract. Naturally, we who see in a certain way, especially if in the 
majority, would possibly be tempted and deem it necessary to remove such a hindrance to 
seeing in “normal” fashion. But, DuBois might say veiled seeing is normal for African-
Americans because being born in this demographic deems its reality. 
If Washington is lifting the veil, could he be damaging the “sight” of the unveiled 
recipient? Usually we think of blinded people being given some type of corrective 
surgery or lens to work with the ability of the eyes to see. Washington adds nothing in 
unveiling, but strips the inborn mechanism to see clearly the reality the man has grown 
accustomed to viewing. Isn’t it more damaging to strip someone of something they are 
born with? How would someone know if they are talking to a veiled individual in the first 
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place? What does a DuBoisian veil or the veil lifted by Washington look like on a flesh 
and blood person? In order to answer this question I would like to lower the veil this time 
and examine how it is intended upon the wearer and potentially myself or others who 
might conclude that they have unveiled at some time in their lives or still might be under 
one. 
A Veil in the Experience of Muslim Women 
In seeking to understand a veil I have looked at masks, a child under a blanket, 
and even the veiling of some Muslim women. The veiling of Muslim women is 
interesting in that the women are covered, but still seen. Physically veiling is not an act of 
hiding or invisibility; it is an act of presentation. No one hides under a veil. Much like a 
blanketed child you know that they are there. They have a form, a personality, an 
intellect, a way of being in the world, and are presented before you. The physical veil 
limits what you as an observer experience. You see one aspect of the woman in a veil. 
Your imagination tries to fill in the blanks of what you deem invisible. Fanon expressed 
this in his text on the Algerian haik. French men fantasized about the potential beauty 
possessed behind the veil (haik) of Algerian women. This fantasy gave way to a mixed 
veiling and unveiling of Algerian women in a dual expression of personal pride and 
commitment to a cause, religion, familial tie, and/or independence.  
The veil shrouding the subject of Booker T. Washington’s statue might in this 
instance be seen in a certain way and being made invisible by Washington’s insistence on 
the direction he is pointing. If a veil identifies aspects, could this project (the statue) be 
one of identification? Washington may not want to unveil his subject, but in agreement 
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with DuBois wants the natural gift he is born with to emerge. If this is a lowering of the 
veil, then who lifted the veil in the first place? In lifting this veil there may be a 
possibility that the man has had his “birthright” taken. The lowering of the veil might just 
be a restoration of the original inborn reality of the man in his world.  
Lowering a Veil 
If a world is unfamiliar it is common to bring something into it that which is 
understood or familiar. This object then orientates us, positions us in something that we 
know and of which we are comfortable. This known object need not be physical, just 
familiar. We look for intersections of thought for example, a stream of conscious activity 
relative (in the same familial context) as our own thinking. Sara Ahmed does this 
beautifully in her disclosure of the table of Husserl (Ahmed, 2006). We have possibly 
overlooked such an element in which so much academic activity is carried out. Husserl 
wrote extensively in a time in history void of computers and word processing. The table 
became a means for his work and thought to progress. It would also seem that the table 
became a familiar object that he could go to and be comfortable in the practice of writing 
phenomenology. Why didn’t Husserl continue writing in mathematics I always wonder? 
Sure, the cube is geometrical and can properly disclose mathematical principles if 
needed, but we note the objects and their proximity, not the thought in the world of 
Husserl when disclosing his phenomenology. In Husserl’s table, we see his thought based 
on what he disclosed from this familiar place. Husserl’s thought seems as if it is 
orientated to look straight ahead and not focus on the rigorous world outside of his own. 
It is also as if Husserl doesn’t see the different ways of being in his own house (child’s 
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play as their work, view of his wife or the nanny’s work, a view of his work from these 
perspectives). We might also consider that DuBoisian veil in which an African-American 
is said to be born with is not considered as a familiar object. The veil has been 
highlighted in politics due to its presence on Muslim women. This focus is usually to 
point out a need for unveiling such women. The case of Fanon’s Algeria is one example, 
the French law to not permit the veil under Nikolai Sarkozy, and the unveiling of women 
and sexual assault in the aftermath of Arab Spring all come to mind. It is as if the veil is 
problematic when realized. We could say that it makes a familiar way of interacting (face 
to face) unfamiliar to a culture orientated a particular way. It may be also said of a veiling 
in the context DuBois speaks of in The Souls of Black Folk. 
The Souls of Black Folk describes African-Americans as a “seventh son, born 
with a veil and gifted with a second sight in this American world” (DuBois, 1989). The 
veil as an object would look odd on a newborn child. Just as it is unfamiliar to see 
blemishes or covering on a child extracted from the womb of a mother, it would be 
equally unfamiliar to see a distinct covering over the face of such a child. When exactly 
does DuBois propose that this seventh son is born? He describes cultural groups in his 
work that the reader of his day might be familiar with, but specifically comes back to the 
familiarity of the world in which he has his origins, the “American world” (DuBois, 
1989). “This American world” constitutes an orientation toward a familiar way of being. 
We might recall saying the Pledge of Allegiance, learning the fifty states and their 
capitals, and singing “My Country Tis of Thee” as school-aged children. We are 
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orientated to the patriotism of the American world in this way. DuBois interjects that this 
world is see in a “doubled” vision for the person with the veil. 
A physically veiled individual (such as a woman with an Algerian haik) is 
orientated to an Islamic world where the Qu’ran, Sharia law, and Arabic are central 
figures. Because of this she might have the propensity to embrace the veil as part of her 
world. We view the veil in our “American world” as if it is a cumbersome sign of 
exploitation. Our women are free to wear what they want; even if that means that they 
might be exploiting themselves in the process at times. But that is our “American world”. 
It becomes an unfamiliar one when we, representatives of the “American world” and its 
objects interact with the unfamiliar of the Islamic world. We might reach for what is 
familiar to use in such a state of unfamiliarity, usually our ideas. Ahmed (2006) states 
that “objects move in and out of view such that they do have an existence that is more 
than how they present or reveal themselves” (p. 38). The physical veil is apparently 
always there, but the DuBoisian veil moves in and out of view in the familiar and 
unfamiliar experience by the wearer and viewer of its existence. Such is the case in 
Fanon’s (1952/2004) disclosure of the young girl in Black Skin White Masks exclaiming, 
“Look, a Negro!” (p.112). Fanon understands that the disclosure is not just one of his 
race, but also of the historicity of his race, a conception there before his birth. We could 
say that he is born with this race concept that others view and address him by.  
Lifting and lowering are both familiar practices. The objects that we lift in our 
world are what make the experiences familiar. A veil lifted off of a woman who is 
wearing it for the purpose of her cultural tradition might take a certain level of thought 
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and resolve. But the unfamiliarity of the veil described by DuBois discloses an object 
which may be unfamiliar to our “American world” if we are not born with it. Perhaps you 
must have this unfamiliar object lifted or lowered in order to appreciate its existence. We 
might say that we must be orientated to know that it is affixed to us in the first place.  
Ahmed in her text Queer Phenomenology focuses on the concept of orientation of 
the body in her work. Little is said of the face or vision of the orientated individual, just 
that their bodies are thus and so. Washington’s mentee beneath the veil at Tuskegee is 
oriented in a geographical location in the heart of the campus of a university. His body is 
situated beneath the veil and beside Washington, but his gaze is apparently on something 
within the mind of the sculptor. We might say that the posture of the bodies of 
Washington and his potential pupil showcase a familiar relationship between teacher and 
student (teacher standing, pupil seated). But, the gaze of both remains the same. It could 
be said that Washington in veiling or unveiling is revealing or shielding his pupil from 
the things that he sees. If veiling, in Platonic fashion he may be shielding the gaze of his 
student from the vision he must look at. If unveiling, he might be seeking to offer the 
opportunity that comes from removing that which is familiar. 
DuBois’s veil is said to be born fixture of the “seventh son”, the “Black”. Perhaps 
this being born is the history of the race in the conception or eyes of others. We might say 
that upon his or her realization of how they are perceived, a person under such 
circumstances looks at life differently. Herein is the veil, the third character of Keck’s 
sculpture and a readily hidden device plainly seen in the art, but overlooked because it is 
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unfamiliar. We could say that this phenomenon of the veil is to be presented right in the 
view of people and yet never be truly seen. 
Looking at Invisible People 
Hunters and soldiers when engaged with an objective of battle or the hunt seek to 
hide using something called camouflage. Camouflage may be worn for the purpose of 
blending into an environment. It might be an adornment that allows the differences of the 
environment in comparison to the person to go unnoticed. People that wear camouflage 
may embrace it as a second skin or an extension of their existence in the time and space 
they occupy. The importance of this second skin is not that it is seen, but renders the 
wearer to be covered by what is familiar. 
What would a camouflaged individual look like outside of the theatre of battle or 
the hunt? Looking at hunters that have their requisite dress on it might be said that such a 
man or woman is identified by what they do (hunting) or more specifically by what they 
appear to be (a hunter or huntress). Camouflage in a grocery store for example would 
offer no regard for the background of the hunter or soldier only their occupation or 
preoccupation with hunting or battle perhaps. But, is this preoccupation or occupation an 
imposition of our own thinking of the uniform of the hunter or soldier? 
What about when the camouflage is not physical, but mental and cultural in 
nature? Does such camouflage still take on the same patterns and lines as physically 
represented camouflage? Is such camouflage bought or issued? What happens if you 
“wear” your camouflage into a store? What does the camouflage look like? 
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Camouflage can be said to mask its wearer in the effects of an environment. If in a 
wooded area a good camouflage would address the contours and lines of shrubs, trees and 
leaves. If in the desert, camouflage would mimic aspects of the desert’s sand. It is as if 
the camouflage masks the wearer from the environment. A mask is fitted to the wearer. 
Affixed by something we may take for granted like a piece of elastic cord, string, or a 
button. The object connecting the mask to the wearer is artificial and possibly fragile. 
Cords and strings may overstretch and break, buttons fall off, and masks that may have 
once concealed the wearer may be a point for their exposure. Perhaps this is the case with 
the camouflage worn in a grocery store. It appears out of place not because the hunter or 
soldier imposes an environment in the store, but because they are no longer hidden. 
Paul Laurence Dunbar’s (1968) poem on wearing a mask speaks of a mask’s 
“grinning and lying (p. 355).” Dunbar speaks of how the mask hides expression, shades 
the view (eyes), and conceals feeling (bleeding hearts, tears, sighs). We might say that the 
mask conceals or dulls the external signs of humanity in environments outside of 
comfortable expression. It is as if we are behind a mask outside of a masquerade ball or 
costume party. We might see such masking as odd, an occasion for potential robbery, or 
simply surmise that someone is on their way to a party. A mask when presented as worn 
may challenge the familiar. Here the familiar is an environment. An environment that 
Dunbar thinks that the world deems we are seen as happy most if not all the time. 
Dunbar’s work is intended from the perspective of an African-American. Though 
parallels can be cited within other groups, his emphasis and perspective show a familiar 
way of being under the mask for African-Americans. He speaks of “torn and bleeding 
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hearts”, “tears”, and “torture” for example that are the forefront of the experience of the 
individual wearing the mask. The mask it seems is in the background of the wearer 
though in front of him or her. All the feelings mentioned take place right before the 
wearer. It is this background that I would like to explore. This work explores the 
background of how a veil masks or camouflages the central elements of its wearer. 
A Phenomenology of a Veil 
A mask is defined in terms of covering all or part of the face. When we use the 
term mask as an activity we can say that the act of masking is to veil the face. The veil is 
not a new phenomenon in the act of masking people. Groups like the Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) would veil themselves in white sheets in order to conceal their identities and play 
into the outward expressions and ideas of fear within populations of African descent. The 
purpose was to present and cover at the same time. These “veiled” men could have been 
recognizable within the communities their activities took place. Their masquerade may 
have been for the purpose of expressing who they really were behind their physical act of 
masking. It is as if their act of masking created an effect of maskness throughout the 
communities in which they masqueraded. What might this masquerade look like? Why is 
it that no one saw the necessity of unmasking themselves to one another? 
The veil of the KKK and the veiling of the African-American community were 
both familiar and unfamiliar with the veil. We might imagine a recognizable figure 
behind a veil speaking through a sheet and the familiar tone and voice of the speaker 
coming to the forefront of the veil. This seems as if it would violate what such a veil is to 
stand for. We wear masks of different types so that we are not recognized as ourselves. 
60 
 
We might wish to be mistaken for another person, disregarded, or just simply be heard 
yet unknown. It is as if there was a responsibility behind being known. What if the 
masked person is identified? “Mr. Smith, I recognize your voice anywhere.” How might 
we respond if we are seeking to hide and are found out? If our place of refuge as a 
background, a camouflaged object is discovered. An element of our maskness is that it 
appears before others, but is only seen as a background.  
Ahmed writes on the background of the white page of paper. It is a necessary 
convenience to read the writing in black, but the black text still seems to go unnoticed. 
We might say that this essay is written on a white sheet of paper. As I type the text on my 
computer I see it as black text, but what if I make it another color, what then am I trying 
to do? In coloring my text I emphasize the words more and distinguish them from the 
background. My colored text no longer hides in the mundane like an extended 
background, but is unveiled, unmasked, unobscured from the background of the white 
paper and blended black text.  
We could say that the veil found in writing is the text itself. Text in particular 
subjects can be described as having to “look” a certain way. The work of e.e. cummings 
provides an example of a veil in the writing of the classical poem. Writing in all 
lowercase letters is unfamiliar and creates a foreground for the work in question because 
the intentionality of its appearance. If cummings merely had grammatical errors in his 
work, we might experience in reading his work that he made many mistakes. But, it is as 
if cummings invites us to the foreground of his work explicitly. He doesn’t blend his 
words upon the white sheet, he exposes them there. 
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The thought of exposure comes with the experience of the veil and the act of 
being invisible. In one of my works on veiling I discussed my two-year old under a 
blanket. His experience under the blanket was very different from my own. The blanket 
was familiar to me. It was given by an elderly church member at my first son’s birth and 
was emblazoned with a familiar character, namely Winnie the Pooh. The blanket had a 
history all of its own, but it was not the focus of my experience. The blanket made my 
son familiar and unfamiliar to me at the same time. I knew he was under the blanket, but I 
was left with how to interpret who he wanted me to see him as under the blanket. It was 
as if the blanket was his mask. It was like attending his masquerade ball, left to imagine 
not only the character under the blanket mask, but the representation of the mask as he 
wore it. The blanket was a background item to the experience.  
The Intention of a Veil 
Robert Sokolowski, Max van Manen, and Sara Ahmed all agree that 
consciousness is a directed activity. We can call this direction intentionality. In terms of a 
veil or veiling, how does intentionality present itself to the consciousness of both wearer 
and observer? We might say that both wearer and observer engage in a spectacle of 
presences and absences. What is present to the wearer? What does he or she fail to see 
under a veil? How does an observer behold maskness? These aspects highlight the 
intention of a veil. We might consider someone wearing an outfit to an event like a suit. 
A suit could be worn out of the familiarity of the event or occasion such as a “black-tie 
affair”. The suit would then be of necessity because it identifies you as familiar and being 
familiar with the environment you have gone into. However, if you wore camouflage to 
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the same event there may be an occasion to suspect that you are unfamiliar with such an 
event, are disrespectful, or possibly both. It is as if the wearer of a vestment, mask, or 
particular style of dress wishes the worn element to be a background item. Making it a 
focal point may be an unfamiliar representation of the item worn.  
The intention is to present the item, not to highlight that it is there. Frantz Fanon 
discusses the phenomenon of a veil using Algerian women. Some women of Islamic faith 
wear a haik or veil which covers a differing spectrum of the head and/or body. The haik 
in particular concealed all parts of the Algerian women. The Algerian women were not 
hidden from view, much like a two year old under a blanket, but were not seen like the 
women from France or other non-Algerian countries. The haik, a background item, made 
the familiar expression of women unfamiliar to a country that had grown accustomed to 
seeing the faces and bodies of women. It was as if Algerian women became more like 
colored print in the midst of black and white text. Not from what the French men could 
see, but from what they could not see. 
The Aspects and Profile of a Veil 
If we imagine a veil, we might say that it is just a piece of thin cloth covering the 
face in a masklike fashion. A view of a veil or mask from the side may reveal its 
faceness. There is a face all its own for the veil. The mask of Dunbar could be interpreted 
as such a veil. The difference in a Dunbarian mask is that we do not see it as one, we see 
the camouflage the “fitness” of it in a conventional society. It is so common in the 
experience of viewer and viewee that we disregard that it even exists before us. We are 
ignorant of such a mask, because it is custom made to the face of the wearer or what the 
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wearer has deemed his or her face. Faces are familiar, masks are not. Yet, perhaps 
Dunbar’s mask is a familiar face. What is it that makes such a covering so different from 
the blatant masquerade before us? Dunbar might say the grins, the lies, and the myriad 
subtleties. It is the veil as a mask that lies to us or that we possibly allow to lie to us as to 
what lies behind it. Perhaps this is how someone can reside there behind it, not hiding, 
but camouflaged from the viewer as who they might really be before you and I. 
The Twisting of a Veil 
The twist of a veil is simply our knowledge of what is behind it. DuBois (1995) 
says the “Black” is born with a veil (p. 7). Before the knowledge of the world is imparted, 
there is a veil. We could say that such a person is never unmasked to the world and would 
attend a masquerade as “themselves” as we know them. It is as if we never truly know the 
individual in possession of the veil, we know the veilness or maskness of such a person. 
Who is such a person trying to be and why are they masquerading in plain view? What is 
the occasion of their “masking”? Perhaps if they took off their mask it would be like the 
Phantom of the Opera, a marred visage that makes the masked wearer seem more 
relevant, more normal though different, more familiar, and more acceptable to view. Or 
we might say that the mask is a background item that is worn so often that it is a given to 
view one on such a person. Much like clothes worn each day. It is expected to look 
“normal” in a civilized Western society or in DuBois’s “American world”. 
What would it be like to see someone without a veil or mask? Fanon answers this 
question in his A Dying Colonialism in discussing the unveiling of the Algerian women 
by the French government. The Frenchmen expecting a hidden beauty behind the veil and 
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are “disappointed” at the “plainness” of the women when revealed. Their expectation was 
for some exotic, hidden, jewel or beauty to be exposed once the veil was lifted. The 
background of the veil was one of beauty, mystery, and a geography or locale worth 
visiting. It was as if the veil was Maybelline or Cover Girl enhancing the appearance like 
a cosmetic. We might say that the veil is a tool of fantasy that appears before us as real 
and actual in order to make our perception of individuals validly familiar to our culture. 
Perhaps, this is the case of the Algerian veil. 
If we look at the mask of Dunbar, the veil of the DuBois, and the concept of 
invisibility seen in Ralph Ellison’s work, we could say that the apparent under the veil, 
mask or cultural camouflage has a similar cultural effect. We don’t recognize the veil 
because we are assimilated to fantasize otherwise. It is as if the veil were like the 
Emperor’s New Clothes. So apparent a child can see, but ignored in order to appear 
familiar. In the story weren’t the clothes so “lightweight” that you couldn’t feel them and 
its appearance only realized by the “unfoolish”. Here we could say that we have been 
indoctrinated not to wear masks for foreground, familiar, everyday interaction, but 
viewers and viewees alike have been assimilated not to view them although they are 
affixed to the face and readily seen, much like a man or woman in the middle of Wal-
Mart wearing camouflaged hunting gear. 
Conclusion 
When we read a Dunbar, an Ellison, a DuBois, a Fanon or any other host of 
writers, philosophers, and scholars of Africana descent, what are they unveiling in their 
words? Dunbar reveals to us his mask that grins and lies. Ellison discloses his realization 
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that he has tried to “uncover” himself only to be rendered invisible by those viewing him. 
DuBois concludes that at birth he and those like him are born with this covering, this veil 
that renders his view of the world different, a second sight. Meanwhile, Fanon speaks of 
the skin that he is in being unable to “mask” the history his black skin represents.  
Paul Laurence Dunbar would say that we all wear the mask. Masks and veils are 
not idiosyncratic to people of African descent, but, perhaps we can say that there is a 
mask of certain type that each wears. What would a mask of someone contending with 
mental illness look like? What would a Hispanic mask look like? What does each group 
try to mask or render itself invisible from? In looking for a foundation for masking, we 
can simply look at the act of covering or masking an object. We do not try to hide an 
object in masking or veiling them, we are simply rendering them as “negligible” objects. 
The child behind the blanket, the masked man or woman in ceremonial garb, the KKK 
member, and even African-Americans writing poems, books and essays are not trying to 
hide, but to be rendered negligible. Here we might say that Ellison introduction to the 
prologue of Invisible Man fits within our understanding of negligibility: 
 
I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar Allan 
Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man of substance, 
of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids — and I might even be said to possess a mind. 
I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me.  (Ellison, 
1990, p. 3) 
 
 
One might recall that the word negligible is an adjective that can mean insignificant, 
trivial, unimportant, or so small as to not be considered. We might say that the individual 
is not masking themselves, but masking an aspect of themselves. For example, we might 
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use race as such an aspect. It is as if the moments provided in the history of Africana 
people groups, the profiles, have become the identifying aspects. Sokolowski (2000) 
states that, “Identity belongs to what is given in experience, and [recognition] of identity 
belongs to the intentional structure of experience” (p.21). This identity is a public 
display; the display of the masked or veiled individual just chooses to be one of fantasy to 
be filled in by the viewer with the intent to look familiar, concrete and camouflaged. 
Perhaps, the essence of maskness, the ability to camouflage and be rendered invisible is 
nothing more than making the readily apparent faceness no more than negligible features 
under a sheet. 
We might say, contrary to H.G. Wells and Ralph Ellison, that there are no 
invisible people, only those rendered invisible through the mask they wear or the veils 
they are born with. An invisible person may be better rendered as a negligible person to 
another, but not a total sum of nothing. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel might say such 
an individual is in the act of becoming (Hegel, 1977). This becoming might be the 
historical consciousness in the revelation of an on-born veil or facing the reality of an 
occupation. Just as a revelation of “I like hunting” or the National Guard’s creed of “I am 
an American soldier” brings the necessity of wearing camouflage to fit into certain 
environments. Perhaps the revelation of raciality and the skewed race relations of the 
“American world” DuBois describes bring about the need for a veil or a realization that 
this veil was there all the time for our use. It is as if the invisible people, those behind the 
veil, “unreveal” themselves to familiar environments. We might say the veil is two-fold. 
It is a cover for the one viewed and a blinder for others who view it. Veilness could be 
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said to be a rendering of invisibility, not, as Ellison states, that we are a Poe-like spook, 
but because we refuse to see the person as a familiar face. Perhaps the issue of veilness is 
not about the veil, mask, cover or camouflage at all. Maybe the reality of Dunbar’s 
revelation of our wearing a mask is in the environment. Our faces and bodies covered by 
a veil or mask are no more than a consequence of familiarity within the unfamiliar. So, 
perhaps as Paul Laurence Dunbar states, “we all wear the mask” to camouflage who we 
really are, what we really feel and the pain and “myriad subtleties” we wish to conceal. 
Perhaps, we are all invisible people. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HEGELIAN DIALECTIC AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN EDUCATION 
 
 
In TIME magazine’s 2013 edition of “100 Ideas that Changed the World”, 
number fifty-seven on the list is ascribed to the German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel. Hegel is pervasive in philosophy. His most notable influence, however, 
is the reading of his philosophy by Karl Marx. Marxism takes the methodology of Hegel 
out of the “realm of pure thought” to the material world and its impact on the “means of 
production” (TIME, 2013). Hegel and his philosophy in general are deeply historical and 
difficult to comprehend at times. But, his historicity and complexity are disclosed in a 
process of how thought works, making him an attractive thinker for philosophers to 
model. 
Hegel’s ideas are said to be complex and obfuscating (Sperber, 2013; Spencer and 
Krauze, 2006; Singer, 2001). This has not deterred various readers, philosophers, 
theologians, and revolutionaries from gleaning from his work. He begins his work with a 
criticism and expansion of the ideas of Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason 
(Spencer and Krauze, 2006; Popper, 1940). His critique is explained later in this essay so 
the contents of it will not be disclosed here.  Yet, what can be said in brief is that Hegel’s 
philosophical turn looks at history as an important tenet. For Hegel, history is not 
random, but a “comprehensible process” that is directed by “laws” and discerned by 
“looking at history as a whole” (Brewer, 1984, p. 2). Hegel’s view of history notes that 
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such a history is the “story of the development of ‘reason’ or ‘spirit’” (Brewer, 1984, p. 
2). For this reason, Hegel made the ‘idea’ primary and the real world secondary (Brewer, 
1984, p. 185). Marx is credited as an excellent reader of Hegel for his turning the 
dialectic right side up as it was “standing on its head” (Marx, 1979 ). For this cause, Marx 
is seen as “Hegelian” in style (Brewer, 1984, p. 21). 
For the purpose of this essay, I would like to exploit Hegel’s style of dialectic to 
reveal Africana thought in education. I engage in this exploration due to a distinct 
absence in the literature for this topic and the significance put on the work of Hegel in 
identifying the stages of consciousness in the acquisition of knowledge. In order to 
explicate the thought of Hegel and the world of the African, African-American, and what 
are identified as people groups of the African Diaspora (the Caribbean for example) I 
would like to use Frantz Fanon as a complimentary voice. This essay will include his two 
chief works, Black Skin White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth to meet this 
criterion. The content of the essay will go along this wise, a short biography of Hegel and 
Fanon, a short explanation of Hegel’s philosophy and methodology, a short explanation 
of Fanon’s philosophy and its gleanings from Hegel, a working through of Hegel’s 
method to Africana thought in education, and concluding remarks. The aim of this essay 
is to answer the question of “How does an Africana consciousness reveal itself in a 
Hegelian fashion?” 
Hegel: An Introduction 
G.W.F. Hegel was born in Stuttgart, Germany in 1770; the same year as both 
Beethoven and Henry Wordsworth (Lavine, 1984). As a student he is noted by 
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biographers to have made full analyses of books he read, even copying long passages in 
diary-like fashion (Durant, 1961, p. 221). He seems to be an avid student of Greek 
literature as he uses many appeals to Greek culture and literature to make some of his 
points (Durant, 1961; Lavine, 1984). Initially a seminary student, Hegel sought to be a 
Lutheran pastor before his deep love for Greek literature and philosophy led him 
otherwise. Adopting the life of a philosopher, Hegel tutored, edited a newspaper, and 
later taught at a University in a town called Jena. At Jena, Hegel would witness, by his 
account, Napoleon conquering the Prussian army. It was at this climactic moment that 
some say Hegel finished his seminal work, The Phenomenology Spirit. 
Romanticism aside, The Phenomenology of Spirit, completed in 1906 was part of 
Hegel’s compendium of work that would “attempt to teach philosophy to speak in 
German” (Durant, 1961, p. 223). Hegel’s work is intertwined with his brand of 
“dialectical movement” (Durant, 1961, p. 223). Dialectical movement in Hegel’s 
depiction of it means that the “condition of thought” or how we think about things “leads 
to its opposite” before uniting with it to “form a higher or more complex whole” (Durant, 
1961, p. 223). This is the premise of the methodological process of Phenomenology of 
Spirit, which will be examined in brief within this essay. 
Hegel’s Dialectic: A Three-Fold Cord 
 
 
…a threefold cord is not easily broken. 
Ecclesiastes 4:12 
 
 
In Plato’s dialogues the appeal for truth often leads to a discussion of 
mathematics. Mathematics gives a concrete understanding of a concept where an abstract, 
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loose argument would lead to more questioning or worse a fallen argument. In geometry, 
the first time a shape is made is when there are three sides. Greek literary scholar Ann 
Carson gives the understanding of a triangle in terms of a letter between lovers (Carson, 
1998). A writer presents the conception of the love between author and reader and the 
letter itself bridges the empty space between lovers. 
Dialectic is triadic like a triangle in that the author or abstraction meets 
interpretation or negation to bring about a conception of what is shared between author 
and reader. This method will bring abstraction and negation together in order to form a 
concept to view just what mis-education is in contemporary, K-12 public education. 
The method of dialectic used for the philosophical inquiry has been identified as 
that which was utilized by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel’s dialectic hinges on 
the historical precedent of philosophy and the impact of the French Revolution. German 
idealism strongly influences the philosophical bend in Hegel’s method. Our question here 
is, “What does a Hegelian methodology entail and what exactly does it look like?” 
The Look of Hegelian Dialectic 
A dictionary definition of dialectic states that the term is derived from the Greek 
term dialectikē, meaning roughly the art of conversation or discussion or more literally, 
reasoning by splitting into two. Bhaskar (1993) cites the first generally applied context of 
a philosophical nature was attributed to a Socratic mode of argument, or elenchus, which 
was a differentiation from the Sophistic, eristic, that is the technique of disputation for the 
sake of rhetorical success, by the orientation of the Socratic dialogue towards the 
disinterested pursuit of truth (p. 14). Because of this link to Socratic dialogue, some link 
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the origin of dialectic to the dialogues of Plato. Plato in disclosing the thought of Socrates 
utilizes a dialectical method in presenting information. This methodology is more than a 
back and forth bantering (eristic), but more like midwifery, a “talking cure”. Two are in 
conversation about a subject and effort is made to allow the “thing in itself” to speak. The 
thing in itself speaks through analogy, metaphor, and an illustration distinct to a historical 
or present phenomenon (recall the azure sky and the law of chromatics) privy to the 
conversation in a contemporary setting. Ultimately, the dialectic, its subject, and its 
examples to elucidate its meaning must be a correlate, a distinct product of its times. 
Relevance to a contemporary age is not necessary, but is a welcomed consequence of a 
dialectical subject and the cyclical circumstances surrounding lived existence. Dialectical 
tradition, as it will be defined for the purpose of this study, falls into a basic principle of 
expression to exemplify the methodology (Ball, 1979). 
Expression of a Dialectic Methodology 
Plato’s ideological analysis of concepts is exemplified in his Allegory of the Cave. 
The understanding is that the phenomenon we see is the shadow of external forms (Ball, 
1979). Think here of the images on the cave wall as temporal pictures of a more 
exhaustive “portrait” of existence. Aristotle extended this view with his use of categories. 
In the Platonic dialogue Parmenides, recall that Socrates is overpowered by the Sophist’s 
idealism because of the inability of his dialectic to categorize what the material, concrete 
world was in time and in particular space as the examples (ideals) were not presented or 
limited by these constraints (Austin, 2007). The dialectic in this phenomenal world is 
therefore contextual in nature. This is to say for the dialectician, consciousness is a 
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consciousness of something (the object or thought) (Dove, 1971). For Hegel this means 
that it is historical (emerging in time and space) (Spencer and Krauze, 2006, p. 41; Plant, 
1999, p. 23).  
Aristotelian logic “expresses” context by delineating analytical classes and 
reordering them into a system much like a master builder would form a brick wall one 
brick at a time (Ball, 1979). Hegel’s teaching of logic showcases this expression in new 
and novel ways for education. Believing students needed schema to build upon, he taught 
logic by building up to it through emphasis initially upon law, morality, and religion 
(Tubbs, 1996). In The Phenomenology of Spirit, he notes his appeal this way: 
 
…science dare only organize itself by the life of the Notion itself.  
(Hegel, 1977, p. 31) 
 
 
This is to say that we cannot teach grammar (as Hegel outlines) without first appealing to 
the structure of language. Such language would infuse the culture and mores that would 
naturally emerge into the structural realities of grammar and its presentation. Here we see 
the links to the historical (Aristotelian logic) and Hegel’s take on philosophy and his 
dialectic. 
Building and extending on this tradition is G.W.F. Hegel. Hegel looks at the thing 
in itself, that is, how the process actually plays out in practice. In response, Hegel would 
say instead of putting our forms in the proper place like a wall (or grammar into 
language), we place the forms in abstractions based on the labels we have imposed upon 
them. Here abstractions can be the thoughts as they are presented to the student (or 
consciousness to use Hegel-specific terms). The problem with abstractions is the 
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tendency to view the whole as a product of constituent, idiosyncratic parts. Hegel 
resolves the abstraction problem by stressing that the abstractions are not effects of 
specific causes, but expressions of an empirical whole. Therefore, the principle of 
expression stresses holism. This holism, according to Hegel, must be mediated by 
thinking. 
In summary, expression positions dialectical method outside of correspondence 
theory gives possibilities for further development and “usefulness” in applications of 
philosophical inquiry by utilization of a holistic, systematic approach. Ball (1979) states 
that “consciousness has [affinity] for the natural world [since] it is part of it” (p. 791). 
Hegel develops expression through “human interaction within a sociohistorical context” 
(Ball, 1979, p. 791). Therefore, the principle of expression is based in logic of 
relationships. This logic of relationships becomes both a strength and a recurring element 
of a dialectic method. 
The Triadic Form of Dialectic 
Dialectic holds the position that human thought develops in a triadic fashion. 
Much like the triad of Carson, this triad can be expressed in terms of being, nothing, and 
becoming; thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; or abstraction, negation, and the concrete. 
Popper (1940) defines a thesis (a proposal or initial viewpoint) as the posited idea, theory, 
or given moment. The Merriam-Webster dictionary of the English (American) Language 
defines thesis as the first and least adequate stage of dialectic; a position advanced and 
maintained by argument; and a proposition to be proved (thesis; m-w.com, 2013). It is 
interesting to note that Hegel does not use the terms thesis, antithesis, and synthesis 
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(Singer 2010). These terms will be used here, however, for the purpose of clarity and 
definition.  
Tubbs (1996) notes that Hegel applied to teaching would be to mediate (form a 
beginning for thinking) and go on to a second thing characterized by negating or 
“contradistinguishing” it (p. 190). Hegel advocates as one seeking for a critical attitude 
concerning thoughts that are presented to us. Popper (1940), in like fashion, states that 
“our critical attitude produces the antithesis (p. 406). Therefore, an effective triadic 
dialectic in the format of Hegel would be a critical look at the presentation of a structure 
(whether ideological or material) within the world. It was Hegel’s view the “philosophy 
exhibits the appearance of a circle” (Hegel, 1975, p. 23; Tubbs, 1996, p. 192). This is to 
say that it does not have a principal beginning in who presents the information. The 
beginning of philosophy for Hegel and his dialectical method was thought itself (Hegel, 
1977; Tubbs, 1996). Here we also see the limits of Hegel’s methodology. Popper 
describes dialectic and the dialectic triad as certain developments or historical processes 
that occur in a certain, typical way (p. 411). A critique of dialectic by philosophers is the 
vagueness of this method (Popper, 1940). It is easy to force a dialectic interpretation on 
all sorts of developments and on different sorts of things (Popper, 1940, p. 412). Because 
of this tendency it is best to merge the dialectical method with a theoretical and 
philosophical framework. Thus, we have the success and pervasiveness of Hegel’s 
monumental work, The Phenomenology of Spirit and one of the motivations for the essay 
at hand. 
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Hegelian Dialectic 
Just as Hegel looks to the historical for clarification, we must look to the history 
of Hegel’s method and its emergence to glean an understanding of its occurrence. The 
posturing of Hegelian dialectic comes as a result of the struggle (debate) between 
Continental philosophy (Cartesianism or rationalism) and the mainly British empiricism. 
Cartesianism, the school of Rene Descartes, was characterized by its “[recommendations] 
of its reasonableness” (Popper, 1940, p. 413). This idea states that we can construct the 
body of science without reference to experience; rationalism informs us that reason 
coupled with propositions must be “true descriptors” of the facts. In contrast, empiricism 
states that only experience enables us to decide the truth or falsity of a theory. Pure 
reason cannot help us find the truth in empiricism according to this view. This is the 
essence of the scientific method taught in primary and secondary school science classes 
today and is the basis for the idealism of Immanuel Kant as he presents it in his Critique 
of Pure Reason. In order to understand Hegel and his brand of dialectic, Kant’s 
contribution will be briefly outlined as a theoretical root for Hegel’s philosophy. 
 Kant initiates his empiricism with the fact that science exists. Explanation of the 
existence of science is the progression of reason. From the premise of “how is science 
possible?”, Kant poses the epistemological problem of how the human mind has the 
capacity of “grasping the world”. This line of reasoning follows that the mind ‘grasps’ 
those things that are not utterly different from the mind’s structure. Popper (1940) 
describes it as the world not being utterly different from our mind, because the world is 
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“mind-like” (p. 414). The world enters into our mind by the senses. Therefore, Kant’s 
proposal of reason is a dichotomy of realism and idealism. 
 Hegel extended Kant’s view by focusing on the concept of “How can our mind 
grasp the world?”. The theory, echoing Kant, was that the grasp of the world is based on 
the fact that the world is like the mind. In opposition to Kant, however, Hegel did not 
stop at the concept of the mind formulating the world, he boldly declares, “our mind is 
the world” (Hegel, 1977). Hegel’s philosophy can be disclosed in terms of the statement, 
“…that which is real is reasonable” (Hegel, 1977; Popper, 1940, p. 415). It was the 
dialectic of Hegel that allowed rationalism to construct a theory of reality out of pure 
reason and, in so doing, argue against and refute Kant’s arguments metaphysics. 
It is worthy of note that the dialectic of Hegel is inspired by Kant. Kant’s 
argument was that knowledge is “limited to [possible] experience” (Kant, 2004; Popper, 
1940, p. 416). Apart from possible experience, Kant would posit that any pure reasoning 
beyond this parameter is not justified (Kant, 2004). The argument of possible experience 
was explained using the components of thesis and antithesis (Hegel’s Abstraction (Being) 
and Negation (Nothing)). A theory of knowledge could be proposed which was unbound 
by possible experience and be adequately defended. However, using the same method, a 
contrasting antithesis could be proposed that “carries a similar force of conviction” 
(Popper, 1940, p. 416). Kant’s conclusion was that reason is [susceptible] to arguing 
against its own proposals and to contradict itself if used to go beyond possible experience 
(Kant, 2004). Experience becomes the help in avoiding ambiguity and indicates what 
theories should be eliminated.  Hegel’s work would be to address this challenge and 
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overcome the Kantian refutation of rationalism (Popper, 1940). He met this challenge by 
saying “contradictions do not matter” (Popper, 1940, p. 416; Hegel, 1977). As long as a 
contradiction emerges in the development of thought and reason, it fits within the 
paradigm of rationalism. A contradiction shows the insufficiency of a theory to account 
for thought, reason, and reality as an unfixed, developing entity (note Kuhn’s anomaly 
and crisis here in the sciences). Hegel would attest that the world as mind-like framework 
gives the indication that both are aspects of evolution (Hegel, 1977). Further, Hegel 
would state that Kant’s refutation is better suited for metaphysics, not dialectic, since a 
metaphysical system would be defined free of development, contradiction, and 
instability. It is because of this correlation with reason and development that the direct 
relationship of mind and the world occur. The mind’s thought and the world becomes 
dialectic developments. Thus, the mind (rationalism) and the world (empiricism) are 
defined in terms of the dialectic triad. 
For Hegel, philosophy is the highest expression of reason (Hegel, 1977). The 
application of the dialectic triad is most successful when applied to philosophy (thinking 
through in a systematic fashion) (Popper, 1940). Hegel (1977) believed that dialectic was 
our “purposive activity”, an actual procedure when reasoning or thinking (p. 12).  The 
activities of movement, life, and the world at large showcased dialectic at work. An 
argument is made that dialectic, since it overlooks the law of contradiction, is an invalid 
reasoning mechanism for scientific pursuits. The argument here is that the dialectic is 
based in these pursuits, but is best suited to map out how we reason. The problem is the 
tendency to differentiate from logic and fall into dogmatism (Popper, 1940, p. 418). 
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Hegel describes his method as “the only true method of scholarly and scientific 
exposition (Hegel, 1977; Singer, 2004, p. 99). It is a method with a ‘simple rhythm; to 
dance to it takes no great skill (Hegel, 1977; Singer, 2004, p. 100). The start of Hegel’s 
dialectic triad is his Abstract or Being. This abstraction shows itself to be inadequate or 
contradictory. Recalling the questioning of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues, the 
revealing of inadequate ideals was often a principle aim of his encounters. Negation, the 
inadequacy or contradiction, explains the second stage of the triad. For example, freedom 
is an inadequate term to fully describe a base for a whole society. What contradicts 
freedom as an absolute is the terror associated with the freedom of masses left to 
themselves without law. A balance or full disclosure of the abstract concept of freedom 
and harmony is found in a ‘synthesis’ of the terms. Fusing harmony and freedom would 
be a terminal effect of a dialectic dealing with the dynamics of a developing “free” 
society. This example is used since Hegel places immense weight on the necessity of 
progress. The onward movement of history is “the secret to the immense influence of 
Hegel on radical and revolutionary thinkers” (Singer, 2004, pp. 101-102). 
In the spirit of Hegel we will focus on the concept of “How does the mind grasp 
the mis-educated world of schooling?” Using Hegel and Fanon to disclose both the 
racialized and mis-educated mind, we must first categorize this mind in the same spaces 
presented by Hegel for clarity. Hegel categorizes his phenomenology into to three 
overarching categories. These categories are consciousness, reason, and Spirit (Hegel, 
1977; Spencer and Krauze, 2006). The phenomenology of Spirit further organizes these 
areas into fourteen more categories. For brevity and focus this essay will focus on the 
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first category present by Hegel (consciousness) and the four subheadings of sense-
certainty, perception, understanding, and certainty of self (self-consciousness) (Hegel, 
1977). 
Dialectic is by no means new to education. John Dewey was said to have “cut his 
philosophical teeth” on Hegel’s philosophy. Most Marxists understand their Hegelian 
roots. Recall Marx in his afterword to Capital stating that he turned Hegel’s method “on 
its head” (Marx, 1979). Marxism will not be the focus here, but there is no doubt that the 
dialectical materialism of Karl Marx’s philosophy has made its presence known in 
educational spaces with such identifiers as “socioeconomic status” in our labels placed on 
the children we teach. 
Fanon: An Introduction 
For this study the Hegelian bend in dialectic will be expounded upon through the 
philosophical lens of Frantz Fanon in order to address two areas of concern seldom, if 
ever, mentioned apart or together by Hegel or Hegelian scholarship. These areas are the 
issues of race and education. Fanon was a Frenchman from Martinique that worked as a 
psychiatrist in Algeria. As a result of his work in Algeria with both French and Algerian 
soldiers and civilians, Fanon became an Algerian freedom fighter and advocate for the 
imperial decolonization of African people. 
Fanon’s link to Hegel is through the philosophy of phenomenologist Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty, in turn, was a protégé of Alejandre Kojeve, a formidable 
reader of Hegel’s work (Kojeve, 1980). Due to these links and the obvious reference to 
Hegel in his work Black Skin White Masks, these philosophers will be included to fully 
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disclose the challenges within this inquiry. Fanon’s philosophy is based on his two 
principal works, the aforementioned Black Skin White Masks publish in 1952, and his 
seminal work, published posthumously in 1963 entitled The Wretched of the Earth. In 
Black Skin White Masks, Fanon discloses the objectivity of blacks (Africans in Fanon’s 
context) in relation to their European counterparts. For the European, the black, 
according to Fanon has no subjectivity and is only seen in terms of an objective, an end 
(producer of some type of work) and is therefore disconnected from a subjective gaze of 
humanity (they are seen as animals or beastlike).This disconnect between subject-object 
leads to what Fanon describes as an inferiority complex. In The Wretched of the Earth, 
Fanon discloses a rallying cry to the revolutionaries of Algeria. The Wretched of the 
Earth is most notable by lay readers and scholars alike as a call to violent realization and 
has even been interpreted as no more than a diatribe advocating violence and terrorism. 
Fanon explicitly states that to get to decolonization you violently take back your 
subjectivity. For this essay using Hegel and Fanon to address the problem of education 
and race I will look at dialectic as a means to interpret the phenomenon of mis-education. 
Mis-education as is a term coined by Carter G. Woodson in his seminal text, The 
Mis-education of the Negro. Woodson looks at African-Americans (Negroes) in his 1933 
text that have matriculated through institutions of education. His drive is to disclose the 
apparent ineffectiveness of African-Americans that are considered to have been 
“educated”.  This “education”, which he terms mis-education, is described as not just 
failing in its effectiveness of teaching individuals that happen to be black, but for 
teaching lessons void of relevance to the cultural experiences and realities of those it 
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should educate. For Woodson, the problem is not one of a lack of educational exposure, 
but a lack of pertinence in the experiential life of the black. 
Mis-education as a Dialectical Concept 
In linking Hegel to Fanon and then correlating their contributions to the concept 
of mis-education it is important to first pose the problem of mis-education in dialectical 
terms. In order to accomplish this I would like to first present the work of Thomas Kuhn. 
Kuhn in his text entitled The Structure of Scientific Revolutions states that “paradigms” in 
science changed through a process of anomaly, crisis, and paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996). 
Since Hegel has a keen eye for the concept of science in his work (the word science 
appears at least once on every page of the Preface and Introduction in Phenomenology of 
Spirit), I would like to use Kuhn briefly to illustrate a reading of Hegel into the 
problematic of race and education in public spaces. First, it must be noted that for Kuhn 
an anomaly is the basis for addressing a change. This change may have always been 
apparent, but was not an issue since science dictated for a time the acceptability of a 
concept. For the sake of this example, we can view such a concept as race in terms of its 
acceptability as a concept. Hegel, as well as Kuhn, would agree that the anomaly to a 
concept is only an anomaly as far as it strays from the historical understanding it has been 
given. Kuhn uses an example of the scientific reality of the past, the geocentricity (Earth-
centered) of our solar system which is challenged by information that contradicts this 
initial premise (certain constellations disappear during particular seasons within the year).  
This anomaly or contradictory point brings about a crisis to the scientific community that 
cannot be ignored. Failure to resolve a crisis results in a shift of the paradigm. Now of 
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course we understand that the solar system is heliocentric (Sun-centered) because a 
paradigm shifted due to a crisis with previous thought. Like Kuhn sees the scientific 
world, Hegel sees his philosophical world in a process of three-fold disclosure. However, 
Hegel sees an abstraction (world presented), a negation (world as it is interpreted), and a 
resolving sublimation (a concrete conception) of the two. Hegel often uses the terms 
Being, Nothing and Becoming to explain these three movements. For the purpose of this 
essay I use the terms interchangeably. 
Utilization of Hegel entails that we understand his philosophy. Understanding his 
philosophy puts us in a posture of understanding his general history, especially since 
history is a key component of his philosophy. Hegel as a scholar was fluent in Greek and 
Latin with a thorough grounding in the classics, Greek tragedies being a favorite (Spencer 
and Krauze, 2006,p. 8). He recorded everything he studied in diary-like fashion, and his 
often cryptic style of writing emerges as a consequence of his desire to absorb everything 
of an intellectual nature (he quotes from memory). Initially, Hegel trained to be a 
Lutheran pastor and has a theological bend in his writing necessitating for him that 
“poetry could heal the rift between religion and reason” (Spencer and Krauze, 2006, p. 
13). Reading Hegel we see that a chief influence on his intellectual life was Johann 
Goethe.  Victor Lange notes that, “Goethe’s perception, his thinking, his speech, his 
writing, is attached to images (Lange, 1968, p. 83)”. Hegel in like fashion uses images or 
has one in mind when writing (from memory) about the philosophical conceptions he 
seeks to portray. Hartner (1968) in his text Goethe and the Natural Sciences states: 
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The highest would be: to understand that everything real is theory in itself. The 
azure color of the sky reveals to us the basic law of chromatics. Do not try to go 
behind the phenomena; they themselves are the doctrine. (p. 145) 
 
 
From this quote we understand that Hegel depicts his philosophical world in concert with 
the thought of Goethe. I will use more examples later to showcase this parallel. Hegel 
states that “…we can only know the world as it appears to us, and is experienced by us – 
not as it is ‘in itself’” (Spencer and Krauze, 2006, p. 31). He further states that we 
“comprehend…only as filtered through the categories…[constitutive] of our subjectivity” 
(recall here Fanon’s use of the subjective-objective in his work) (Spencer and Krauze, 
2006, p. 31).  
Reflecting the example of Kuhn, we must understand that the paradigm Hegel 
utilizes is that all truth is historical (Spencer and Krauze, 2006, p. 41; Plant, 1999, p. 23). 
Hegel begins to work toward his magnum opus with the initiation of a multi-volume 
system of science. The key text of philosophy attributed to Hegel emerges at this time, 
namely The Phenomenology of Spirit. It is Hegel’s “guide to the science of Absolute 
Knowledge” (Spencer and Krauze, 2006, p. 56). Understanding basic modes of human 
experience is the prerequisite in his philosophy for “reaching Absolute Knowledge” 
(Plant, 1999, p. 25).From this work we see Hegel’s system at work in disclosing the 
operation of the consciousness. For Hegel, subjectivity (read self-consciousness) is 
immediately a consciousness of a lack of something, which is a lack of an object. 
Therefore, to be subject begins with having a desire for something (for Hegel this is 
freedom). Exemplifying the subject-object dynamic is Hegel’s master and slave 
metaphor. In this metaphor the slave works and learns to produce thus seeing selfhood 
85 
 
through the work of the hands, while the master remains dependent upon the slave for 
recognition, personhood. The dynamic becomes one of independence versus dependence. 
This metaphor is noted here due to its pervasiveness in existentialism and also Negritude 
(the fledgling movement of which Fanon is noted to have initially taken interest) and 
more recently, the Black Consciousness Movement (Spencer and Krauze, 2006, p. 61). 
Having described a little of Hegel and his influences, I would now like to give an 
overview of his method, dialectic. 
Hegelian Dialectic, Fanon, and Mis-education 
One of the earliest memories I have in school in reading and hearing the words of 
our constitution, “We the people…”. The significance of these words from the United 
States Constitution and my educational past intersected upon writing this section due to 
the simple word, “WE”. “We”, as it were, seems insignificant, but a significant portion of 
Hegelian scholarship has focused on this term and its impact may be one of the keys to 
really understanding Hegel’s methodology in The Phenomenology of Spirit. In saying 
that, “I remember the phrase ‘We the people’”, I linked a current educational experience 
with my past. I presented a thought that you (the reader) and I (the author) can engage in 
a similar thought. This thought may have been that you too remember learning the words 
of the Constitution of the United States or have never read the document for whatever 
reason, but whatever it may be there is a “we” between us. This “we” links us to a similar 
line of thought. The thought makes us conscious of something (he is writing about the 
Constitution or I am thinking about the Constitution). Thought at its height might 
contradistinguished this initial presentation in some way (those words were not just in the 
86 
 
Constitution; that wasn’t in the school curriculum at all). Regardless of the content of our 
contradistinction, true thought may emerge when we move from an initial presentation to 
a point of more ardent observation. Hegel (1977) states that consciousness 
“…distinguishes from itself something to which it at the same time relates itself” (p. 70). 
This is to say, using the example, knowledge in itself may be relational, but not 
necessarily true. The question of truth is not a direct concern here, but in 
phenomenological terms is “bracketed” (Dove, 1970, p. 617). Herein, we see the 
movements, the process of Hegelian dialectic in disclosing the content of the 
consciousness to the observer of phenomenon. First, we must note some description of 
“knowledge as it appears” (Hegel, 1977, p. 66; Dove, 1971, p. 618). Second, is the 
Concept, this is the object as it sits within the “temporal process of the consciousness” 
(Dove, 1970, p. 618). This Concept makes me of an opinion that Hegel (as well as Fanon) 
postures himself as a product of his times (Hegel, 1977; Fanon, 1952/2004). He sees his 
viewpoint from the limited perspective of consciousness that see a limited picture of what 
is behind and as the Apostle Paul states in 1 Corinthians 13:12, “…through a glass 
darkly” towards the future. Hegel’s third movement is the “observation that 
consciousness selects its own standard and comparison to knowledge” (Dove, 1970, p. 
620). In Hegel’s words, this means that consciousness is “consciousness of the object”, 
“of its self”, “what to it is true”, and “its knowledge of this truth” (Hegel, 1977, p. 72; 
Dove, 1970, p. 622). Dove (1970) states that the experience of consciousness is therefore 
a “[description] of dialectical process” (p. 622). This process arises out the course of 
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experience that is described. Experience is dialectical to the degree that it produces new 
objects (knowledge) for itself (Dove, 1970, p. 622).  
Hegelian dialectic and experience is contingent upon the function of appearance. 
Appearance then becomes a component of phenomenal experience as it is described by 
the consciousness. For Hegel, “genuine experience is a self-revealing process” and 
philosophy is a “description of this process” (Dove, 1970, p. 623). For the sake of this 
essay we will define experience as the described activity of language and work.  This 
definition is gleaned from Hegel’s take on experience that “it is an act”, and that “it can 
be said of it, what it is” (Hegel, 1977, p. 236). Therefore, learning the Constitution’s 
preamble was an experience for me. It was an activity (learning) that involved reading 
and reciting parts of its contents. However, this experience was idiosyncratic. Hegel’s 
definition of experience involves that there is an act. For me this is a reality, but for you 
the reader, it may not be so. I have simply imposed my experience on you and gave you 
parameters to accept its validity. Here is where the concept of we comes in. Instead of 
focusing on my past learning experiences, how can I make such an expression beneficial 
to the current reader’s experience or students learning the preamble? This is the effort 
undertaken by Hegel in his phenomenology. 
Work in describing Hegel’s method, includes a critique of The Phenomenology of 
Spirit’s use of the term “we” within its contents (Dove, 1970; Hyppolite, 1974). For Dove 
(1970) “we” seems to merely describing the active experience of consciousness in its 
presentation of phenomenological description, yet our observation is also an act (p. 628). 
He concludes his argument concerning the use of “we” as a dialogue that itself is 
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“consciousness’s voyage to the discovery of Spirit” (Dove, 1970, p. 640). The emphasis 
of this study (first three parts of the Phenomenology) is a dialogue between 
consciousness and the “we”; “we” of course being a participant (Dove, 1970, p. 640). In 
like fashion I would like to enter a similar dialogue using the gaze of Hegel, the words of 
Fanon, and, in Fanon’s terms, the “experience of the black”.  
Fanon’s Experience of the Black 
The identity of black’s in Africana scholarship often takes on the gaze of a 
passive observer. A key interpretation of this fact is W. E. B. DuBois’s description of 
double consciousness. Fitting well into Hegel’s depiction of “we” there is a schism 
between the face seen and the face that is presented to the world. Charles Mills in 
Blackness Visible describes the dilemma of Ellison’s narrator in Invisible Man. His 
dilemma is “invisibility” from whites due to “construction of the inner eyes” (Mills, 
1998, pp. 8-9; Ellison, 1995). The result is to create a persona that others can see. Fanon 
(1952/2008) states that the “former slave wants to have himself recognized” (p. 191). 
Here, Fanon actually quotes Hegel verbatim in a previous paragraph leading to this 
comment. He pulls the quote revealing that “self-consciousness exists in and for itself “to 
be acknowledged or recognized” (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 192; Hegel, 1977, pp. 114-115). 
Therefore, we see in the work of Fanon, Mills, DuBois, and Ellison there is an issue of 
acknowledgement and recognition in the experience of the Black. 
Hegel states that one-sided action is “useless” since activity is only brought about 
by “mutually recognizing each other” (Hegel, 1977, p. 230-231). This activity constitutes 
that we have a need to be for someone. With the need for recognition comes a desire to 
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be so recognized and acknowledged. Looking at the experience of black students in 
educational spaces, we often find this need for recognition and acknowledgement play 
out. Following Fanon’s reading of Hegel, we find black self-consciousness becomes a 
dependent and interactive phenomenon (Fanon, 1952/2008; Hegel, 1977; Jackson, 1997). 
Ronald Jackson (1997) in his work detailing black masculinity states that these quotations 
from Hegel’s work “philosophically assert that persons are dialectically juxtaposed and 
serve as mirrors validating the presence of the other” (p. 736). Using this analogy of the 
mirror I would like to take an example and move through the moments of Hegel’s 
method in the voice of Fanon. 
The first point of Hegel’s method involves an experience that must be mediated 
through the discretion of the consciousness. For this example let’s use a phenomenon 
affected students of color in the United States that has already been resolved and 
problematize it. A monumental movement in the relation between race and education 
occurred with the 1954 Brown versus Board of Education Topeka, KS Supreme Court 
decision (Brown vs. Board). Recalling Hegel’s sentiment that we do not begin by simply 
teaching logic (or grammar), but with accessible components that “build the wall” in 
brick by brick fashion in an Aristotelian fashion. We must identify an experience 
correlating with the decision. For sake of argument, a result of Brown vs. Board was 
desegregation of schools. A start for the consciousness might be what a desegregated 
school experience looks like for the black. Theoretically, we could say that a 
desegregated school has students of color (blacks, Hispanics, and so on) being educated 
beside their white counterparts. This sounds good, but is not Hegelian dialectic. First, the 
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thought is imposed and given its parameters. Second, it has not been mediated through 
the vehicle of “we”, there is no dialogue to bring about a contradiction and lead to the 
appearance of and in it as it relates to the presentation to the consciousness. Third and 
last, “we” have failed to consider the source of our inquiry and the point of our need for 
dialectic, the experience of the black. Re-examining this phenomenon we will simply 
start with the historical perspective. Recall, Plessy versus Ferguson was to insure that 
schools of the past were considered separate but equal for the different races within them. 
We now know that this was untrue because students of color (blacks) often received the 
damaged, outdated books of their white peers. Following this syllogism, if the books 
were not equal, it showcases that the education would have difficulty being shown to be 
equal due to inadequate sources of information. The final movement of this process of 
thought was that something outside of the legislation outlined in Plessy versus Ferguson 
was required to insure equality amongst black and white students. 
Introducing Fanon would infuse the deeper issue of race relations into the 
conception of education. Why were students given inadequate materials and what does 
this say of the public perception of white students in comparison to black students? 
Further, if a “civil” society saw fit to bring a case to the highest court within such a 
society, is this the extent to which an individual of color is required to prove his or her 
ability to be acknowledged? The appeal to the Supreme Court showcases the lack of 
recognition of the black and the resilience of the black to prove they exist. Fanon states 
that “it is because the [black] belongs to an ‘inferior’ race that he tries to resemble the 
superior race” (Fanon, 1952/2008, 190). Fanon, even in his statement, details that the 
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conception in the experience of the black is that through subjugation, the experience of 
the white (their recognition and acknowledgement in society) showcases their place in 
comparison to blacks in the same society. Fanon’s sentiment that “there is nothing 
ontological about segregation”, gives us understanding that a person or group with no 
ontology has such a concept of being imposed upon them (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 163). 
Segregation seeks to note difference, but stifle acknowledgement; create a division, yet 
fail to recognize. We see that the decision to desegregate schools was more than equality 
in schooling; it was a scholarly, litigious attempt to be recognized and acknowledged by 
the status quo.  
Fanon gives the following critique of the impact of Eurocentric culture on schools 
that are attended by the black: 
 
The white family is the guardian of a certain structure. Society is the sum of all 
families. The family is an institution, precursor of a much wider institution: i.e., 
the social group or nation. The main lines of reference remain the same. The 
white family is the educating and training ground for entry into society. (Fanon, 
1952/2008, p. 127) 
 
 
The feeling of inferiority is based on the different structures that one culture proposes as 
the norm in lieu of another. The black experience then is one of noticing the differences 
of his or her culture in contrast to that of their white counterparts. Underlying the 
decision of Brown vs. Board is the phenomenon of comparison. The litigants, judges, and 
onlookers of the case had to admit that the cultural structure for one group of children 
reflected in the schools that they attended was not a reflexive reality for another group. 
None asked that all schools be made better, just that schools be made equal. The 
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movement in Hegel’s dialectic would entail a new underlying yet always apparent crisis 
within race and education, we are unconscious of the experience in our schools, just 
looking at the past, that one set of people are seen as a group to not only be 
acknowledged and recognized by, but also to become if we are “experientially black”.  
Conclusion 
Frantz Fanon (1952/2008) states that: 
 
 
We said rather too quickly that the black man feels inferior. The truth is that he is 
made to feel inferior (p. 127). 
 
 
Looking at our current literature about students of color in schools, namely, African-
Americans, we see that many are not performing well in comparison to their white 
counterparts. This dialectical inquiry brings us an understanding that perhaps our method 
of comparison is the problem. The historical background of blacks in education is that 
they are already seen as inferior by whites and oftentimes their own people. Inquiries 
such as this one may showcase to our own thinking that many of our presuppositions are 
wrong. There is literature that showcases an inferiority of black students by notable 
scholars such as Arthur Jensen in his appeals to race-based differences in intelligence or 
Harvard researchers Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in their Bell Curve text. 
Some even purport a bend amongst African-Americans for anti-intellectualism 
(McWhorter, 2001). My point here is not to condemn these scholars or their points on 
their validity and rigor, but to point to an obvious and often overlooked aspect of our 
scholarship concerning Africana people. The point of this inquiry and its query of “how 
does the black mind grasp the world” are answered simply as being in a position inferior 
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to whites. This inferiority is characterized by a desire for recognition and 
acknowledgement of fitness to be just like those deemed superior. The phenomenon takes 
many forms, but its sum is that there are two systems of reference (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 
90). The experience of the black is that he is black on one front and also, black in relation 
to the white (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 90). This is to say that the experience of the black is 
one of comparison. Our society, even some of my work, notes the distinct 
contradistinctions between the experience of white men and women to the experience of 
black men and women. Phenomenal experiences of these two groups are different and 
adversely so because of the inferiority imposed by a historical point of reference. For 
Fanon, the “misfortune of the [person] of color is having been enslaved” (Fanon, 
1952/2008, p. 205). It is because of this enslavement that such a person “has no culture, 
no civilization, and no ‘long historical past’” (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 17). The 
encouragement of future blacks that will experience the world in black skins underneath a 
mask of an imposed culture is this, the “present serves to build the future” (Fanon, 
1952/2008, p. xvi). A man of his time (1925-1963), Fanon left the reader of his work with 
his “reason for living”; that the “future must be a construction supported by [people] in 
the present” (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. xvii). It is my hope that this work of scholarship 
would be a brick to begin the process of building such a future. 
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CHAPTER V 
FANON’S BACKDOOR: THE MIS-EDUCATION OF FRANTZ FANON 
 
 
Carter G. Woodson (1933/2006) describes the backdoor as a “demanded” or “cut” 
structure (p. xiii). In considering a door I am curious as to what it is a backdoor to. 
Apparently, this location is behind or in addition to some other door. A backdoor might 
have a knob or handle. Perhaps there are no hinges or frame at all. Maybe it is just an 
opening. As Woodson speaks of a backdoor, there is no opening this door and entering 
into something. But, isn’t this the purpose of a door? Doesn’t a backdoor lead into the 
same area as a front door?  
The Jim Crow era of de facto and de jure segregation had “backdoors”. Much like 
Woodson’s mis-education, this backdoor was often sought out. While Woodson says that 
the backdoor is a consequence of “when you control a man’s thinking”, is this necessarily 
negative in nature? What if crafting such a door helps us realize whatever is behind the 
“front door”? This essay will examine this phenomenon of entering through the means of 
a backdoor by using the work of Fanon and phenomenologically intending Woodson’s 
backdoor. 
Fanon the Doctor 
Foucault’s (1973) quote in Madness and Civilization about “the prisoner of the 
passage” speaks reminiscent of the slave experience (p. 11-12). Stripped from their 
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homeland, never to return, the once free African now sails on the freest of mediums only 
to travel and arrive in chains. How does a man or woman once free react to the bondage 
of chains and the gentle rocking of the vast, open ocean? The sea in Foucault’s depiction 
of the prisoner is a crossroad. Free, yet bound fast, the land in which such a prisoner 
disembarks into is the unknown, much like the current or the wind which drives him or 
her on the journey to a land unknown. What if the “land” in which someone disembarks 
upon is not a destination at all, but a concept? Like Melville’s Captain Ahab, some board 
the ship to chase a phantom that can lead them to the specter of infamy. For Ahab it was a 
great whale, for Fanon in Black Skin White Masks it is to be an authentic, subjective 
individual, recognized and substantiated as more than an object, but as a man. Is this not 
madness to desire a reality far from the reach of where you dwell, to set adrift to a land 
unknown by a colonial mind? Apparently not, as Fanon travels the routes of Negritude, 
psychoanalysis, experience, authorship, and analysis to come to the conclusion of a “man 
who reasons” (Fanon, 1952/2004).  
For Foucault (1973), the “language of psychiatry…is a monologue of reason 
about madness…” (p. xi). Fanon is trained and experienced to understand and speak this 
language as evidenced by his work in Black Skin White Masks and The Wretched of the 
Earth. If we relegate Fanon to a “prophet of violence”, we may forget that he was 
educated and practiced as a doctor of psychiatry. Fanon worked with the realities of 
madness during the Algerian war. He may have been privy to this “monologue about 
madness”, but, unlike Foucault, Fanon is not merely interested in the history of madness 
as it emerges in the European psyche and life, but in the mind of the Black. More 
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specifically, the colonized man or woman of color is of interest to Fanon. Whether this 
color is the Black of his native Martinique or the Arab of his adopted Algeria, Fanon 
finds the parallels of the individual set adrift with no ship, no destination to a land that is 
not recognized as one’s own. This is colonization, a madness that seems to set the 
individual in its grasp adrift in their own homeland and within their own mind. 
It can be argued that the state of mind in Algeria for colonizer and colonized alike 
was one of madness. Foucault (1973) speaks of madness in the writing of Shakespeare 
and Cervantes that it “occupies an extreme place, in that it is beyond an appeal” (p. 31). 
This is best realized in Fanon’s appeal to violence in The Wretched of the Earth. What 
does Fanon see that incites such passion? The first chapter of the text entitled 
“Concerning Violence” speaks of armed violence against oppression and also speaks of 
taking up arms in its concluding chapter. What about madness, colonial madness, causes 
Fanon to write in a flurry of words his opus though cancer racked his body? Is this 
colonial madness to be considered a sickness worse than death? 
In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon gives several case studies from his work in 
Algeria. One of the more gripping depictions for me was one particular case of Algerian 
teens that had murdered a European friend. When asked why they killed the boy, one of 
the teens states simply, “[Because] they want to kill us” (Fanon, 1963/2004, p. 200). Is 
this an aspect of colonial madness? Possibly so. But, intentionality of colonial madness 
could be looked at as a two-sided coin. We could say one side of this coin consists of the 
colonized individual (Fanon’s Algerian for example) and the other the colonizer (such as 
the French). If we say there is one, there has to be the other at some close proximity. As a 
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novice numismatist, I notice that you identify a coin by the “face” side and the other side 
becomes the “back” of the coin. We don’t usually define coins by what is on its 
“backside”, but regardless of definition the one coin whether “face-side” or “back-side” 
up still has the same value. Perhaps colonial madness is to devalue the valuable by 
disregarding that it has a “face”. Backs of coins often are composed of symbols as 
opposed to faces. These objects often have underlying meaning. With like value and the 
same consistency of metal as its front side, the back side of a coin is not seen as the 
subject of the coin until it is flipped on its end.  
We might say that a colonizer and those that they colonize are two sides of the 
same coin. They are two worlds in one territory filled with two languages, two cultures, 
two countries, and two histories. A constant dichotomy loaded with Manichean twoness. 
What happens when two occupy the space of one? Usually, we simply change language 
with adjectives or prefixes. A bicycle, for example, has two tires that work in tandem 
with one another and has been accepted as a normal configuration compared to its cousin 
the unicycle, which few, if any are seen operating. A bilingual individual has two 
languages occupying their mind. In a more transient, fluid society this also becomes a 
regular fixture. Dual citizenship means an individual is a citizen of more than one 
country. Therefore, the boundaries of the two countries do not exist as barriers between 
one another, but doors.  
Colonizers and the colonized are different from these examples of twoness. The 
colony may never see itself as a “normal” fixture of the colonizing country, but quite 
possibly an economic respite or destination for a vacation. Two languages exist, but they 
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may still occupy two kinds of minds: The mind of the inhabitants and the mind of the 
colonist. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the colony is the boundary without 
entrance that may exist. A colony may not have permeable boundary. We might even say 
that a boundary has not been clearly defined. Let’s say an Algerian of Fanon’s day is 
taught to speak French, use francs (French currency) for purchases, eats French cuisine, 
and dances to French music on weekends. School is in French, radio broadcasts are in 
French, and the home, though Algerian, seems to look like a French one. There is no 
twoness here, it actually sounds like an extension of France until the boundary between 
the French and Algerian are defined. What does such a boundary look like? What marker 
marks its dimensions? Why is it so difficult to navigate and locate for those that are 
blocked by it?  
One might say that this boundary is like a heavily guarded establishment 
surrounded by a gate. As a child of a military parent, I recall living on an Air Force Base 
in Spain. A base is and was the point where the American military could “extend” itself 
into another country in order to operate. I remember the base had a fence all around it 
with few places of entry. The places of entry were called gates. Entry into the gate 
required a pass or special permission before entry was granted. I am sure Spain had 
people that could speak English fluently, ate hamburgers, wore Levi’s and Nikes, and 
drove a Ford or Chevy. This did not grant them access to the base and actually held no 
bearing or consideration in their moving to the other side of the gate. It showcased that 
the gate was a boundary they could not cross and identified a point of departure they 
would not “extend” into. Maybe being colonized is like that, having a boundary right in 
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front of your face whether seen or unseen, but upon attempt to cross its gate, you find that 
you cannot. 
Defining Boundaries 
How are boundaries defined? If a boundary is wrapped up in a person’s twoness 
such as being French and Algerian, then there might be a definitive point where Algerian 
ends and French begins. For the Algerian believing he or she is French, this end may be 
met when in the “face” of someone that is a gatekeeper for the definition of Frenchness. 
The gatekeeper checks the credentials of Frenchness at the boundary between being 
Algerian and French defining the boundary of what is and is not French.  
A gatekeeper may define Frenchness based upon how he or she identifies it. For 
Fanon, such a “keeper” was identified by the language of a child. The emphatic, “Look a 
Negro!”, is a significant point in Fanon’s treatise on Black embodiment. “Look a Negro”, 
may assume in the mind or experience of the child different things. One might say that 
Negroes are rare in the world of the child. Or perhaps Negroes are not seen in the fashion 
as Fanon is seen when viewed. For the purpose of this essay, we could imagine that 
somehow Fanon made it across a boundary into the space occupied by a child that found 
him familiar and unfamiliar at the same time. We could say that this is the child’s first 
experience of a Negro visually. It is almost as if the child is saying, “He looks exactly 
how you told me one of them would look.” Perhaps the significance of boundaries is 
separation. In our American nomenclature we call such boundaries which separate, 
borders. This may be saying that we are not establishing lines of distinction like on a 
political map, but areas of exclusion. The exclusion of Fanon in the eyes and experience 
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of the child in his Black Skin White Masks text is one of race and colonization, but could 
it also be a fear of the unfamiliar? 
Xenophobia 
Xenophobia is the fear of strangers. A stranger is a person who is considered 
strange in comparison to or foreign in relation to us. Xenophobia can manifest itself in 
many ways involving the relations and perceptions of an ingroup towards an outgroup, 
including a fear of losing identity, suspicion of its activities, aggression, and desire to 
eliminate its presence to secure a presumed purity. Xenophobia can also be exhibited in 
the form of an "uncritical exaltation of another culture" in which a culture is ascribed "an 
unreal, stereotyped and exotic quality". We see this us and them paradigm play out in 
such statements as “taking back the country” or the blatant racism of Jim Crow de facto 
and de jure segregation in its attempts to avoid miscegenation. In my reading of Fanon I 
see the perspective of the ostracized foreigner or stranger in his or her own country. It is a 
means by which a self-fear and inferiority complex occurs because the black in Fanon’s 
words is unable to be an “other” to his black counterparts. Therefore, the black becomes a 
stranger in his or her own skin: A stranger to be feared due to being unknown.  
If xenophobia is an experience of our fear of unknown people, what then is the 
experience of xenophobia? Fanon would cite the child’s emphatic exclaim. The child 
appears to identify that which is foreign. Language is used to identify a category, a 
location for Fanon to be as he is presented to the child. The child linguistically identifies 
that the definition of “a Negro” fits on the presented individual in their view. How does 
the child know about this foreign experience to identify it? Why does Fanon seem to take 
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time to repeat this experience? Gordon in his text on Africana Philosophy notes that for 
Africana philosophers, the knowledge is located or situated somewhere. The knowledge 
of what Fanon details as Black skin is a located or situated one. We might say based on 
the child’s words that this location is situated out of the everyday experience of her 
world. Where then did Fanon have to come from in order to be a foreigner to someone he 
felt he had a common culture?  
As an African-American male student I have experienced the feeling of being 
located or situated in certain spaces. In each case in which I have been “located” within 
my race there is an appeal to rationale behind my “being” in a particular place. It is 
similar to the experience of walking into a building or room for the first time. You know 
that you are supposed to be there, but knowledge isn’t what you need to make you 
comfortable, your connections make you comfortable. Someone experiencing a person 
foreign to them does not seek comfort with the individual, but with ideas. If such ideas 
are fearful ones, it may be comfortable to not connect with these individuals, but to 
ostracize them further. 
Xenophobia makes the uncomfortable comfortable. “Look a Negro”, is a comfort 
for the child. It validates a history, utilizes a language, and establishes a border or 
boundary. For Fanon, the boundary separating what it means to be French and the mind 
of the child, which may represent the mind of his proposed fellow citizens of France, is a 
closed door. Where Fanon’s black skin is a “barrier” to his realization of Frenchhood, his 
white mask becomes a door to connect and possibly gain entry. Reminiscent of DuBois 
veil, Fanon presents the illusion of a black body with a familiar white mask. I attempted 
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to establish in a previous essay that the veil was a camouflage rendering the wearer a type 
of invisibility. The point of such a veil, as with Fanon, is not to be seen, but to be unseen. 
We make statements in the English language like “it remains to be seen” or “seen and not 
heard” or even the Biblical reference that states that “eyes have not seen”. Seeing is a 
vital component of experiencing. “Look” exclaims the child that sees Fanon, while not 
seeing Fanon. I recall Biblical prophets being told by God in passages, “what do you 
see?” What do we see when we look at people different from us? If it is a phobia like 
xenophobia, Fanon (1952/2008) might say, the anxiety associated with the object of our 
“fear or a situation” (p. 132). The situated body, the object is a problem for the mind that 
has been conditioned to see it as one. In such situations we may block access to the doors 
where “contact [may] arouse anxiety” (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 134). This is where the 
necessity of backdoors may begin. 
Woodson’s Backdoor 
A door is a point at which you enter. Doors are usually made to suit entrants 
individually. We especially see this with houses. The solitary door at the front of a house 
is made for the single entrant. Entry is an individual experience unless you are holding a 
child of course. A person entering a house may be carrying groceries or luggage. But 
physically there is no carrying individuals on a regular basis when we travel through a 
door. Sure, there are the occasions of marriage or injury, but for the most part entering a 
door is an individual practice. 
“Foreign” doors require that strangers made some type of identifiable sound. A 
“knock” at the door is usually followed by the inquiry of “who is it?”. If I don’t know 
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you, a reply of an unfamiliar name is either unanswered by the inquirer or allows the one 
questioned to go from who they are, to what they do. Oftentimes who we are and what 
we do intersect. When I am locked out from my house and I knock, my answer to the 
inquiry, “Who is it?”, is loaded with meaning. No one asks, “Why are you on that side of 
the door?” or Where is your key?” at a door because of the simple fact that I belong there 
and should have access. If you have already been in the house and are a “familiar face” 
there, your name opens the door. If you are stranger, what you do may crack the door 
open slightly and require further information as to why you stand at the door in the first 
place. This is different from a stranger calling on the phone, since the door is a vehicle 
for the whole body to travel through the door and enter. You can’t just “hang up” a door. 
Doors are “hung” so you can open and close them. Most front doors open towards the 
inside. We embrace what has already made inroads towards us. Those people in which 
we are familiar have a history with us. These are those that enter through the front door. 
So why might a backdoor be different? 
There seems to be a common theme with backdoors. Such doors are often unused 
or when they are used it is for specific purposes like exiting quickly. Those with the 
luxury of a front door entrance do not need back doors to enter and often disregard them 
as being entrances at all. Backdoors in the Jim Crow era were such disregarded portals by 
whites. Backdoors led to the same venue, but in places that distanced black bodies from 
white ones. The question of “who is it?”, is answered in the door that you are unable to 
even stand in front of to knock on; the door inaccessible to the body. The backdoor was a 
location for a body, a black body to enter. Perhaps this is what Woodson means when he 
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speaks of backdoors; a point where the active body locates itself at the expense of an 
inactive mind. 
According to Woodson, a backdoor is crafted based on mental control of an 
individual and conditioning for its use. But, when does a door become a necessity? While 
I am writing this essay I am actually sitting beside a “backdoor” to my home. It has a 
frame, hinges, locks, a knob, and actually might be the same size as the “front door”. I 
would have no problem going into my home from this door except for the fact that it is 
more convenient to enter in through the front. My backdoor actually gets forgotten most 
of the time. The backdoor remains locked and unaccessed most of the time in my home, 
even though it leads into the same area of the house as the frontdoor. You might say 
doors are more than just entrances and exits. Doors can be legitimate portals into a 
building or residence. Someone entering or exiting a building from a window may be 
committing a robbery for example. Or perhaps there is an emergency warranting an 
escape from a window or entry through one. Doors are sturdy barriers. They are 
boundaries between the wide open areas beyond its frame. Front doors are by no means 
exclusive entrances. I have seen residences where the front door is inaccessible and 
warrants a side or back door to be used. Is this the controlled behavior Woodson speaks 
about? I don’t believe so. Woodson’s door is a constructed device of someone’s 
education. It involves creativity and instruction to cultivate. Contrary to a side or back 
door being used in lieu of a front one, it is a necessity to build it, because no other 
entryway seems to exist. When boundaries separate individuals from the privileges 
behind gates and doors people go unseen or seen in a limited way. A backdoor craftsman 
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might be saying that this phenomenon is a purposeful, forced act. If it is forced, 
calculated, and crafted, then maybe we should examine what such a door would look like 
in Fanon’s world. 
Fanon’s Backdoor 
Perhaps the Fanonian door begins where the door of Woodson ends. Active 
bodies moving at the expense of inactive minds are reminiscent of Fanon’s description of 
the black body. Fanon exclaims at the end of Black Skin White Masks, “O my body, make 
of me always a man who questions (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 206)!” This statement shows 
the active body leading the mind to question. It is a contrast to what may happen at the 
backdoor of Woodson, but for Fanon the body was a means of getting to active 
questioning. How does the body make someone question? How would a question-
inducing body look like behind a door? “O my body!,” appears like he may have been in 
dialogue for some time. We hear of expressions like “body language” where our bodies 
have a way of “speaking” to others, but what does “body language” sound like. Fanon 
seems to have a good dialogical relationship with his body in order to close a formal 
writing with an appeal to his body. Others may be more skilled at expressing the body. 
Interpretive dancers tell a story through their bodies. Maybe we all tell a story with the 
body we reside in. If our story is one of having to frequent backdoors, what would it look 
like? 
Fanon’s door appears to be an entryway wherein the body communicates with the 
mind in some way. This fits Fanon’s work in which he notes that the “body is not 
[opposed] to the soul” for the “backward” [black] (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 106). In another 
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sentence he writes of “his speaking hands” that “tear at the throat of the world (Fanon, 
1952/2008, p. 106)”. As Fanon begins to describe the black body in space and what the 
black body might say, the active body appears to mirror the mind in its expression. 
Something as simple as reaching for cigarettes produces movement that is done, not out 
of “habit”, but “implicit knowledge”, as he slowly “constructs” of himself as a “body” in 
space and time (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 91). It is the activity of the body, a black body, that 
Fanon feels establishes a “dialectic between his body and the world (Fanon, 1952/2008, 
p. 91).” The “dialectic” or opposition between the “body and the world” may be a 
backdoor in and of itself. If a door is a point of entry, then the opposition between body 
and world could act as a gate for Fanon’s black body to engage the entryway to the 
world.  
For Fanon the black man is a comparaison (a Creole term), that is there is a 
preoccupation with “self-assertion and the ego ideal” (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 186). The 
mind is engaged in the presence of another as to its worth and merit. His or her personal 
value is dependent on the value imparted to it by another (recall the coin). The valuation 
of the black body is met at the door. 
Fanonian Violence as a Door 
We must recall that Fanon is addressing a colonized Algerian populous that has 
no organized system of government save that which has been introduced by the French. 
All that they have learned of “government” and “rule of law” has come at the hands of 
oppressors that daily immerse them in the “wayfaring” conquests of Western culture. 
Domination by violence has been the language of their madness. If, as Foucault states, 
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the language of psychiatry is a monologue concerning madness, then Fanon’s soliloquy 
on violence in the Wretched of the Earth is a therapeutic method to ameliorate the 
madness of colonization.  
But, how do we define violence exactly? Is it the use of a weapon? Is it using the 
fist to engage in fighting? Or is it something more than physical contact with an 
extension of the body? A violent clash, a violent death, and an occurrence of someone 
being domestically violent all assume a physical body being use as an implementer of 
physical force. But, what other ways can something be violent. We simply need to look at 
some of the uses of the word “violent” in everyday conversation. Someone might have a 
“violent strain of the flu”. In chemistry there might be a “violent reaction”. Perhaps 
violence does not need a body, but a result. What does this result look like and why is it 
considered violent? In an essay on school violence I defined violence as an act of force 
intended to inflict harm on another (Pryor, 2013). We might say here that the point of 
violence is injury. As a doctor of psychiatry, I can see Fanon having an understanding of 
physical, emotional, and mental injury. No one would deny the experience of physical 
injury having an impact on the mind. Consider stubbing your toe. When I stub my toe it 
is as if all resources go to the new source of pain. Perhaps that is the worst part of injury, 
the pain.  
Hannah Arendt, a critic of Fanon, disagrees with the use of purposefully inflicting 
injury to another. Lewis R. Gordon (1995) calls Arendt a harsh critic of Fanon, but one of 
the few that defend his inflammatory text, The Wretched of the Earth (p. 68). Part of the 
demarcation in thought is Arendt’s take on violence as a political occurrence, while 
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Fanon sees it as an individual experience emerging and ending in significance through 
conscious action to pose an identity apart from a preconceived model of being colonized 
(Arendt, 1969). If I were to humor Arendt and say that violence was a political 
occurrence, what might this violence look like? Something being political might look like 
it is taking a side. Fanon would probably say the side he experienced most often as a 
therapist was violence against Algerians (Fanon, 1963/2004). If violence or injury against 
another is taking sides, is injury on the side of the group inflicting harm, or on the side of 
the individual doing it? If we recall that this is Fanon’s door and a door is made for one 
person at a time to go through we see that violence or injury is an individualized act. One 
individual inflicts a personalized injury not a group. We may later attribute the violence 
to a group, but an individual inflicts the harm. Perhaps this is what Fanon saw, an 
individual being born through a private experience of force upon a subject. 
Fanon’s Last Days 
Further explanation of Fanon’s appeal to violence is possibly realized upon 
reflection of his last year. Alice Cherki (2006) speaks of Fanon’s “wish to die in the 
maquis not being granted” and his desire to “write a book” (p. 159). The maquis was the 
term used for French resistance fighters, usually in guerilla warfare. We could say that 
this was a “front-line” of fighters that engaged in unconventional or “backward” tactics 
of war. Fanon’s appeal was to engage his death in this manner as opposed to the rigors of 
leukemia that had taxed his body. Unable to fight in this manner, his violence became 
realized through the work we have come to know as The Wretched of the Earth.  
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Ania Loomba (1998) discusses Fanon’s “reworking” of the “Lacanian schema of 
the ‘mirror stage’” in order to form the object into a “subject” (p. 144). Lacan’s mirror 
stage is a contemplation of the image it sees. It is a recognition of a subjectiveness that 
constructs itself in the “imitation” of as well as “opposition to the image” (Loomba, 1998, 
p. 144). The experience of a mirror is similar to that of a backdoor. It is a reversal of what 
is presented, but looks like the original. A mirror image is given “back” to the original 
image. Fanon’s mirror, his backdoor, to the Algerians in The Wretched of the Earth might 
be said to be violent realization. What is the experience of this violence? For an Algerian 
during the Algerian war it was armed violence. Force begets force as the backdoor, the 
mirror, is a reversal, an imitation of what originally appears before the forming subject.  
The violence or force for a youth in a classroom chair might be said to be a 
similar imitation. We expect a youth to imitate the dictates of a teacher or an institution, 
when the reality of the youth is the mirror of imitation they will choose. Fanon 
(1952/2008) writes in Black Skin White Masks that “historical and economic realities 
come into the picture” (p. 161). Stuart Hall (1996) notes that “black subject and black 
experience[s]” are “constructed historically, culturally, and politically” (p. 446-447). 
Perhaps these experiences and realities make for the necessity of a backdoor, a way 
across boundaries, and a means to access a world behind the gated, often closed realities 
of conventional front doors of their world. 
Conclusion 
It takes an individual to come through a door. For a backdoor that has not been 
crafted, someone must realize their individuality as well as the necessity to enter into 
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some type of dwelling or venue. Carter G. Woodson does not address what is on the other 
side of the backdoor, nor does he discuss what the front door is in reality. The reader is 
left to assume that there is a front door and that it leads somewhere. In this essay I 
phenomenologically intend that this door is a segue to a larger venue that both front and 
backdoor entrants come into.  The door, though metaphorical, is the noema of this essay. 
It is phenomenologically intended in terms of its manifold profiles. The door can be open, 
it can be closed, and it can be ajar or cracked open. The degree of our being recognized as 
an individual or group renders the door more open to us. As we are considered more 
unique or different from a system of normality, the door is rendered as closed. A literal 
door has two sides of concern. Here only one is discussed since we often rarely think of 
the inside of a door after we gain initial entrance that is unless we “live” behind the door. 
Woodson gives no indication of a “lived” experience beyond the door, just a need for 
entrance. I write this essay with the purpose of establishing that perhaps our conventional 
“doors” and entrances into the realms of education have established a system of 
“backdoor” entrants. We can look at this as negative, but nevertheless they come and will 
enter into the venue or home of our educational comfort regardless of our preparedness 
for their coming through the door.  
As an example I pose Malcolm X. Malcolm X ceased to have the “front door” of 
education at the eighth grade; engaged in various activities of the “underground 
economy”; served time in prison; and was as a spokesman for the Nation of Islam. Yet, 
he entered into the halls of UC Berkeley, Oxford, and Harvard, not as a student, but to 
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impart and debate. So does it really matter which door we enter as long as we get into the 
building? 
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CHAPTER VI 
THAT ROCK LANDED ON US: CONCEPTS OF RACE AND MIS-EDUCATION IN 
 
THE WORK OF MALCOLM X 
 
 
Times have changed, 
And we’ve often rewound the clock, 
Since the Puritans got a shock, 
When they landed on Plymouth Rock. 
If today, 
Any shock they should try to stem, 
‘Stead of landing on Plymouth Rock, 
Plymouth Rock would land on them. 
Cole Porter “Anything Goes” 
 
 
We’re not Americans, we’re Africans who happen to be in America. We were 
kidnapped and brought here against our will from Africa. We didn’t land on 
Plymouth Rock–that rock was landed on us.” 
Malcolm X 
 
 
By act of chance or serendipity I came across the above Cole Porter lyrics while 
reading about Malcolm X. Some seem to think that Malcolm X in his speech presented to 
his newfound Organization of African-American Unity, used poetic license and lifted the 
line concerning the difference between landing on Plymouth Rock and being landed on 
by Plymouth Rock. Plymouth Rock’s use is significant in that it not only is a literal object 
occupying space, but it also is a historical landmark noting a shift in the dynamics of the 
world. Malcolm X not occupying the same time as the disembarking upon Plymouth 
Rock must extend into his imagination to make this statement, whether lifted or not. At 
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any time today he could step upon the actual rock in Massachusetts memorialized as 
Plymouth Rock, but it appears this is not what he is talking about. Malcolm X is 
conscious about something concerning Plymouth Rock that I feel may be worthy of 
investigation. I deem it worthy because his is a story that culminates in this statement. He 
is speaking to individuals (African-Americans) that during the time of his speech are 
privy to the same inequalities as he, yet this statement resonates with them in a 
phenomenological tone. Someone landing on Plymouth Rock may feel the very rock 
beneath their feet. There may be a sense of accomplishment of making it across 
treacherous seas on a boat to what you perceive to be a new life. You would smell the 
saltwater ocean in your nostrils and hear the crashing waves upon a bay or inlet. This is 
the feeling of being above a rock that you land on. But, what of the rock landing on you? 
In Malcolm X’s words, “…that rock landed on us.” If it landed where did it journey 
from? How did it descend to hit you or I? Were we bruised or wounded in the process of 
it landing? This essay will look at the processes of landing and being landed upon in 
order to disclose concepts of race and mis-education in the life and published work of 
Malcolm X. 
Landing 
I recall having a tour of a ship. It was a huge vessel, an aircraft carrier, which was 
much like a floating city. We never embarked anywhere on that massive ship, but I still 
remember the feeling of boarding and exiting the ship. My exit require going through the 
dimensions of the vessels by means of a portal. This portal opened to what was outside of 
the ship. I can imagine this opening being somewhere new like Spain, Italy, or 
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Madagascar. For me it may be an intensely sunny day or extremely windy day so that I 
can feel the season upon my face. There was a ramp on our exit. This ramp connected the 
ship to the mainland. Connection between the ship, the vessel of your journey and past 
location, should be to a distinct point of departure. That ramp was a present experience 
when I walked across it. Standing in the middle I can envision the time I had on the ship 
and the new day or portion of the day that would begin at the end of the ramp. When I 
reach the land I am atop any rocks or sediment, trash, and stand at the end of my journey. 
I might be unashamed if all went well while traveling. I may be tired and fatigued from 
the day’s events. But, I stand. This was what I felt about landing that day. 
Is this the landing of Malcolm X’s words? My landing was a historical event for 
me because of its occurrence in my personal past. The landing of Malcolm X’s quote was 
a historical event of a collective past. The collective past he mentions and refers to is a 
probe into the founding of what he would know to be America and American. If the 
historical consciousness of the American mind is to land, then in Malcolm X’s words, 
“…that rock landed on us.” 
What is Malcolm X’s depiction of American history? Malcolm X’s history 
appears to be an embedded amalgamation of race, culture (were Africans that were 
brought to America), and oppression (we were kidnapped and brought against our will). 
The life of Malcolm X is an intersection of these three factors, but he appears to not be 
conscious of it until he enters the doors of formal public education. His work as a 
minister in the Nation of Islam and later as a Sunni Muslim reflect a “mis-education” 
since he did not go through what was considered proper and appropriate means to be 
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educated. Malcolm X’s “mis-education” would be gleaned from facets of the 
“underground economy”, prison, the Nation of Islam, and the Middle East and Africa. All 
built him into a speaker worthy to present and debate at such institutions as Harvard and 
Oxford, yet he had not sat in a desk of school since the eighth grade. 
Being Landed On 
I also remember my bus rides to school in the fourth grade. The bustling, 
suburban climate of Aurora, Colorado, would welcome the clanging of snow tires up and 
down the roads. As the bus opened its doors, there sat Terry, a long-haired brunette with 
glasses that greeted me by name. My seat, towards the right and to the back, was always 
unoccupied as I sat in it until two stops later when B.J. would sit next to me. B.J. was 
okay at first. Speaking of sports, trading cards, and certain cartoons, but later in the day, 
on the way home he would want to wrestle. I am not a fighter by nature and B.J. would 
usually have me cornered by the window and would sit on me. Today, I still imagine the 
weight of B.J., my equal in age but larger, sitting on me at nine years old. I recall the 
claustrophobia as I thought my last breath was imminent. With whatever breath I had I 
would fight, however, being taught (educated) not to strike my peers lest a harsher 
punishment be imposed upon me, I pretty much took the smothering B.J. imposed. Until 
one day I determined not to take it anymore. As his smothering began I pushed with more 
vigor and when pushing would not suffice I struck B.J. in the stomach and screamed, 
“Get off of me!” B.J. never sat by me again, we never spoke, and today, writing this 
piece, was actually the first time I thought about in a while. This personal history of an 
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imposing weight is what I think about when I hear Malcolm X’s lament of “…that rock 
landed on us.” 
The collective history spoken of by Malcolm X describes a group of people 
conscious of the realities before them of what it means to be an American. Those that 
land on Plymouth Rock came for opportunity and freedoms not allotted to them in the 
country from which they came. Making a landing says that my embarking is for the 
liberties that this space will afford me. Impressed upon the mind of a hearer of the 
statement is that “we” did not land on Plymouth Rock. “We” is such a simple pronoun, 
but possesses such weight and presence that it appears in our constitution’s preamble. 
“We the people” signifies all that the Plymouth settlers were at the time of their 
disembarking, yet missing in this “we” are the individuals Malcolm X’s is speaking to 
and himself. Malcolm X’s identifies the “we” as those that came as a consequence, not of 
freedom, liberty, and opportunity, but the occasion of their oppression. 
Synonyms for oppression run the gamut. Oppression can be domination, tyranny, 
coercion, cruelty, subjugation, or persecution. Malcolm X presses all of these into the 
simple act of being landed upon. It is interesting to note what Malcolm X at the time of 
his speech had experienced and what he phenomenologically intended about the course of 
his life in order to make such a statement. Racial hatred took a young Malcolm Little’s 
father and mother through death and insanity. Racial prejudice took a young Malcolm 
Little’s dream of becoming a lawyer and replaced it with carpentry. Ultimately, the 
canvas of race was an inevitable place for such a mind to focus its thinking. If a rock 
were to land upon an individual it is a purposeful event. A rock that arbitrarily falls may 
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hit an unfortunate person or more but for someone to say “we” means that the landing is 
structured to a certain group of people that are connected in some way. As evidenced in 
his speeches and life, Malcolm X directed his efforts towards removing the crushing 
weight that the rock might impose. 
An Appeal to History 
Malcolm X makes an appeal to American history that discloses the double 
consciousness of DuBois. Recall that DuBois said that the African-American ever feels 
his “two-ness”. This doubled concept of reality is identified in Dubois’s work as “two 
souls”, “two thoughts”, “two unreconciled strivings”, and “two warring ideals” at work in 
one body. The rhetoric of Malcolm X’s words is an appeal to the history in the context of 
an African-American. This history is not one in which the body is allowed to extend to 
new territories, lands, and coasts, but is imposed upon by the symbols of the territories, 
lands, and coasts, like the silent rocks. Malcolm X describes the same rock, but based on 
the history of the individual, its function changes. 
The potential folly of education is that it may teach a sterilized depiction of 
Plymouth Rock. History may be romanticized to speak of the “courage” and “bravery” of 
a group of men and women who endure the vastness of seas to arrive at a point 
representative of their freedom. However, this same history does not discuss the 
economic motivations of disembarking on Plymouth Rock (Loewen, 1995, p. 36). Nor 
does this romanticized history discuss the diseases contracted by the Pilgrims such as 
typhus, syphilis, and influenza (Loewen, 1995, p. 72). Nor are we introduced to such 
information as the first settlers we know as Pilgrims were only a third of the total number 
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on board the Mayflower (Loewen, 1995, p. 81). But, embedded in the consciousness of 
the average American that has been educated in the history of his or her nation is that a 
group of people called Pilgrims “landed on Plymouth Rock” to achieve religious 
freedoms (I know I did). 
Harsh realities of yesteryear act as an antithesis to our history. Malcolm X 
exposes this history in his rhetoric and causes the listener to think. In 1959, a pivotal year 
for both Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam, Mike Wallace and Louis Lomax presented 
an expose entitled “The Hate That Hate Produced”. Wallace presents to the viewers of 
1959 a group whose incendiary rhetoric indicts the Nation of Islam as a hateful, racist 
group. As time would pass, Malcolm X would find his folly in romanticizing not only a 
history of a group, but a current reality. In his own words just like many see an American 
dream, he sees an American nightmare. Ever a dualist in his words Malcolm X intersects 
the worlds of the black and white race. His rationale for this view is that he “sees 
America through the eyes of a victim.” 
An American Nightmare: The Eyes of a Victim 
 
 
I don’t see any American dream; I see an American nightmare.(X, 1965, p. 26) 
 
 
Malcolm X’s speech, The Ballot or the Bullet, explicitly describes his sentiment 
about his place in America in 1964. He does not see himself as a recipient of what 
America has to offer, but as a victim of “Americanism”. The ism of Americanism makes 
for a description of a “negative practice, system, or philosophy” (ism, 
www.oxforddictionaries.com/us , 2013). What is the experience of an American practice, 
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system, or philosophy? Malcolm X would say this experience is one of victimization. His 
viewpoint, by his own admission, is that he has seen “America through the eyes of a 
victim” (X, 1965, p. 26). For Malcolm X, Americanism was a practice, system, 
philosophy of democracy in the “disguise” of “hypocrisy” (X, 1965, p. 26). 
 Just as DuBois depicts African-Americans (black folk) as being “behind a veil”, 
Malcolm X describes American democracy as a “disguise” of “hypocrisy”. Disguises are 
used to present something or someone different than they are in reality. It is a false or 
faked presentation to the world in order to become something different in appearance. Of 
interest within Malcolm X’s quote is the use of disguise and hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is a 
Greek word derived from hupocrisis and hupokrinesthai (ism, 
www.oxforddictionaries.com/us, 2013). The meaning of these terms is to play a theatrical 
part while under a mask and in so doing to purposefully pretend to be something other 
than yourself. The terms are the experience of actors in ancient Greece who entertained 
members within amphitheaters. The theatre was a place to be viewed, to be experienced 
by the senses. We might say that the victim of Malcolm X’s speech is not privy to the 
theatrical part that they are forced to play and is unaware of the masks warn that disguise 
and cover a practice, system, or philosophy. Perhaps this is the definition of Malcolm X’s 
victim, an actor without script forced to play a part in a production he describes as a 
“nightmare”. 
 Malcolm X describes the “victims” as waking up (X, 1965, p. 26). Cone in his 
text on Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X points out the description of Malcolm X’s 
early childhood as a “nightmare” (Cone, 1999, p. 42; X, 1992, p. 3). Malcolm X’s first 
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chapter of his autobiography is amply titled “nightmare” in commemoration of his first 
memory, the burning of his home in Omaha, Nebraska at the hands of two white men (X, 
1992, p. 3). As we read the pages of Malcolm X’s autobiography and read his speeches, 
we begin to see a distinct story emerge. This story if viewed as a play or movie would be 
tragic in its presentation. Perhaps we begin to understand the victimization, the appeal to 
victimhood for Malcolm X’s “22 million” people of African ancestry (X, 1956, p. 26). If 
this viewpoint holds true, perhaps it is the rationale for some of the tragedy we continue 
to see today. We might say the parts played in the drama of purported American 
democracy are but a composition of continued Americanism. 
Americanism in Malcolm X’s Ballot or the Bullet appears to be a historical event. 
If we couple this Americanism coincides with the being landed on of Plymouth Rock, we 
might call this a type of colonialism. Coinciding with the work of Fanon in Black Skin 
White Masks, this Americanism could be called a “colonial world”. For Fanon 
(1964/2004), the “colonial world is a Manichean world” (p. 41). In order to break from 
such a world requires a “historical process”, which discerns its “historical form and 
content” (Fanon, 1964/2004, p. 36). This is the break from the nightmare for Malcolm X 
and the break from the drama of Americanism. We might say that it is a discerning of the 
script behind the hypocrisy or a peak behind the disguise. It is an appeal against 
ignorance. 
Not Just an American Problem 
One of the clearest correlations between colonialism (the practice, system, and 
philosophy of colonizing) and the practices of Americanism can be found in one of 
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Malcolm X’s last speeches. In a speech in Rochester, New York, Malcolm X describes 
“four spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere where black people are 
concerned”: Spain, Great Britain, France, and the United States (X, 2010, p. 164). 
Malcolm X positions the acts of colonization of countries settled by the Spanish, French, 
and British squarely with the activity of the United States. Here we see a broadening 
understanding of the concept of “Plymouth Rock landing on us”. 
If the influence upon black people in the United States is one of colonialism, what 
is the experience of this colonialism? Here, I appeal to Frantz Fanon, an acquaintance and 
direct observer of colonialism in his native Martinique and adopted nation of Algeria. 
Fanon (1964/2004) states that “the colonial world is a compartmentalized world” (p. 3). 
The world divides in two. It divides to reveal inhabitants of different sort. The division of 
the colonial world is what “species, what race one belongs to” (Fanon, 1964/2004, p. 5). 
A divided world can be said to work best when the participants play their parts correctly. 
The colonist “makes” the “history”, “knows it”, and leaves the colonized to believe the 
story (Fanon, 1964/2004, pp. 14-15). The belief in the story, the drama disguised as a life 
of Manicheanism, is a persuasion that “colonialism has never existed” (Fanon, 
1964/2004, p. 17). Perhaps Malcolm X might remark here that this is what it means to see 
an “American dream” (X, 1965, p. 26). 
The American Dream in Education 
What is the experience of the “American dream” in education? If we approach 
this question in terms of Fanon’s statement that a persuasion that “colonialism never 
existed” and that “history marches on”, then what end result emerges from such dreaming 
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(Fanon, 1964/2004, p. 17)? Here Woodson (1933/2000) might suggest his conception of 
mis-education in which there is a disregard of history through ignorance characterized by 
“little or no thought” of his “perplexing status” (p. 134). This “dream” for Woodson 
(1933/2000) is described by a quote from Fredrika Bremer reflecting on her 1850 trip to 
America in which she stated, “The romance of your history is the fate of the Negro” (p. 
139). Perhaps this American “romancing” of history is a cultural amnesia described as a 
“dream” by Malcolm X. The nightmare of Malcolm X is the moment of “awakening” in 
the historical memory of the victim (recall the chapter entitled “Nightmare” in the 
Autobiography of Malcolm X) (X, 1965, p. 26).  
Awakening 
The experience of waking up can be described as the twilight between 
unconsciousness and consciousness. If like Malcolm X describes I awaken out of a dream 
that happens to be a nightmare, my consciousness might still feel the effects of what 
happened during my time asleep. The tragic images of the night terror follow me. They 
are no longer just a past event, but a current part of reality. If such a nightmare was part 
of my reality and the same images from a past event follow me, how might I respond? 
Malcolm X says that millions of blacks were “waking up” (X, 1965, p. 26). What does 
that look like? What awakens them? A circadian rhythm? An alarm? For Malcolm X to 
make such a statement there must be an understanding of something occurring. If a group 
of people wake up at the same time, perhaps they are gathered at the same place. Maybe 
there is an outside event of which they are all a part of a collective experience. For 
Malcolm X the convergence of history and understanding converged. Bremer’s 
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“romance” no longer applied to Malcolm X as he realized a duality, a Manicheanism, a 
mental colonialism, or in his words a “disguised hypocrisy”. Malcolm X is thirty-nine 
when he makes his American nightmare statement. Thirty-nine years is a long time to be 
asleep, but perhaps a necessary amount of slumber in order to realize the tragedy. The 
dual function of the Mayflower and a slave ship converge at this awakening. He realizes a 
difference in his life in comparison to others. He realizes the four-fold influence of 
European and American colonialism on the black psyche. He awakens to a world. 
The Urdoxa of Manicheanism 
Urdoxa is the belief that there is a world (Sokolowski, 2008, p.45). This world is 
not privy to the egocentric predicament that views the world as always coming toward 
you. The world is experienced by individuals. For Malcolm X, the rock at Plymouth, 
though absent, is experienced as “landing on” him. The absence of Plymouth Rock from 
his current experience informs the presence of racism in his time of the 1960’s. How does 
this knowledge inform education? What absences of the past are potentially intended by 
black students? I use Malcolm X’s experience to point out that the body of Malcolm X, 
though chronologically distant from the arrival at Plymouth Rock still feels the effects of 
the bifurcation of Manicheanism. Malcolm X as a phenomenologist of black education 
might suggest a “point of departure” like “what is the experience of blacks in education?” 
What might he use in his analysis? What sides, aspects, and profiles might emerge? What 
are the parts and wholes, pieces, and moments would he use? What are the presences and 
absences of black education? What concretum and abstracta arise? What identity in 
124 
 
manifold is revealed? I would like to conclude by examining these questions through the 
lens of Malcolm X to establish a potential phenomenology of black education. 
Malcolm X as Phenomenologist of Black Education 
Malcolm X could begin a phenomenology of black education at his stint in prison 
to explain the experience of education. If we begin in a Husserlian manner of 
phenomenology we could envision such a study as a six-sided cube. Just as a cube has 
sides, a shape, and parts that are seen and not seen at certain angles, so it is with the 
education of Malcolm X. In the case of Malcolm X, if we begin with the end product of 
his education, we see an individual with the ability to articulate effectively upon the 
pulpits of the Nation of Islam, the lecterns of prestigious colleges and universities, and in 
the face of aggressive interviewers. This is but a side of Malcolm X’s education. We 
might say that this side is the individual that is seen. For Malcolm X this individual just 
happens to be able to articulate well. The presence of his articulation does not show us 
his history, his history is absent until he shows us that history. This history for Malcolm 
X is a desired history. When the history to Malcolm X, both his personal and collective 
history that is shared with other blacks, he is informed by such texts as Carter G. 
Woodson’s Negro History, W. E. B. DuBois’s Souls of Black Folk, or the works of J. A. 
Rogers. This aspect is hidden since it is a history, a past event, yet it is revealed as a 
profile, a momentary view of the individual. Malcolm X’s history is given in a manifold 
of profiles. Therefore, a side of black education is history. 
History may also be characterized as a piece of the individual if it is shared 
collectively. A collective history can become a whole, an independent entity within itself. 
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A personal history would be a moment, a part which cannot be a whole. Malcolm X 
speaking about his father, mother, and siblings is an example of this. Recall that apart 
from his autobiography, Malcolm X does not relay this information often. His speeches 
with most impact use allusions connected to a collective history, either of a distinct 
culture such as the Greeks, the antebellum South, or blacks in general worldwide. There 
must be a larger whole for which moments coincide. This is to say just because 
something happens to one person that happens to be black, this is not true for them all. 
Using the example of a cube, let’s say the cube is a dice. Just because one dice has landed 
or is observed from the perspective of a two, does not mean all dice are also on the same 
number. The experience of “landing” dictates the result of each of the die respectively. 
History though shared collectively is but an abstracta, it cannot exist without the 
individual. Sokolowski (2008) uses the concept of vision as an example of abstracta (p. 
24). We see (have vision of something) as a consequence of the eye. History does not 
arise without individuals. For example, the moment or side of history detailed by 
Malcolm X comes from an individual discussing a collective experience in history that is 
not seen, but realized mentally. The experience is not solipsistic in nature since it is a 
public history for which a relation can be made by others with the same history 
embedded in a collective past. 
Another side to the cube of Malcolm X would be the body. The physical or 
corporeal element is a material, substantial element that can be experienced in time and 
space. At the time Malcolm X is recalling his experience in a literal, physical prison, he is 
in an apartment of his transcriber, Alex Haley in Harlem. In both circumstances the body 
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takes on a presence (the apartment) and an absence (in the prison) in its intentionality. 
Currently, the body of Malcolm X is absent to me so I have to co-intend its presence in 
an empty intention. The physical body is a concretum, “something that can exist and 
present itself and be experienced” (Sokolowski, 2008, p. 24). The body can be presented 
in an identity of manifolds. Often the manifolds of identity are based on the language 
used to identify it. The body can be identified in terms of its function (labor for example), 
its shape, or its cultural identifiers whether politically or socially correct, the identity can 
take on a variety of meanings to an individual or group. The body may be “racially 
profiled”. Phenomenologically, the concept of racial “profiling” would be a “momentary 
view” of the “aspect” or how a side (the body) is given (Sokolowski, 2008, p. 19). For a 
child in school or Malcolm X this is not only a side of how they are in the experience of 
others, but potentially a common element within the experience of the collective 
individuals with similar bodies. 
The last side I will present is that of the mind. Whether in prison, on the streets of 
Harlem, in an eighth grade classroom, or in the presence of Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm 
X had a mind. For Sokolowski (2008), the mind is a moment to the world (p. 25). The 
mind is an abstracta since it is similar to the language we speak. Until language is 
spoken, it is not experienced. In order to be a concrete entity it must be experienced and 
exist. The mind exists in moments to the person perceiving it, but is not always 
expressed. The mind is often fragmented into pieces that are perceived, such as actions, 
language, books, and conversation. All of these are presented as profiles of the mind. 
Take each piece as a literal piece. I recall my son had to get a picture of his head with a 
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certain technology. A scanner scanned and uploaded a profile or piece of his head until 
the pictures overlapped and a full picture of the head emerged in an area of perception, a 
computer screen. In the same way a mind is profiled in the same way by a person 
perceiving it. 
A phenomenology of black education in the voice of Malcolm X might include 
these areas. The point of this writing is not that these areas are distinct to African-
Americans, but are relevant for children in general. The issue is, what are the filled or 
empty intentions of our phenomenological inquiries when confronted with black bodies? 
If our phenomenal experience of black students or any student for that matter never 
leaves the intentionality of the body, we will never intend the mind or history of the 
individual and their personal and collective stories.  
Conclusion 
 A review of the life and work of Malcolm X discloses his constant inquiry into 
the experience of the black in the spirit of Frantz Fanon and W. E. B. DuBois. Part of the 
strength of Malcolm X’s speeches and written works is his ability to reach past a 
solipsistic view of experience of the black into a collective consciousness. He manages 
this accomplishment with an appeal to history, politics, and global of the black. Malcolm 
X’s nightmare is the American dream by his own admission (X, 1965, p. 26). This duality 
is found in his work with the Nation of Islam and his own Muslim Mosque, Inc. He 
prides himself on the ability to relay this dual history, dual mind, and dual experience of 
the black affected by Americanism and colonialism. Malcolm X understood the 
influences of the American psyche as a collective experience affecting black and white 
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alike (X, 2010, p. 164). The concept of collective experience and histories were the 
strength of the connection Malcolm X had with his audiences whether white or black. 
 I included a phenomenology of Malcolm X since in much of his work he speaks 
of education in relation to an appeal to history, global understanding, and becoming (X, 
1970; 1992). For Malcolm X, education links you to something substantial. The 
substance of education may be a collective history, a group of people, or an 
understanding of who you are or what you may become. Perhaps the phenomenological 
turn is the essence of Malcolm X’s work in general. Like a Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-
Ponty, or Fanon, he describes the experience of blacks in America and abroad.  
Malcolm X did not relegate his work to the phenomena of his perception but 
extends his work to the informing of his own consciousness and therefore grows in its 
perceptions and understanding of not only blacks, but humanity in general. This is 
exemplified in his hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca in Saudi Arabia and his revelatory 
experiences of blacks and whites together. This was a landing into a potential reality of 
races living together. Perhaps this is his claim in his quote of landing upon Plymouth 
Rock and being landed on by Plymouth Rock. That life, as well as education might just 
be the realization of a collective, unromanticized past that unites us all.  
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CHAPTER VII 
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION 
 
 
The pivot of Africana philosophy and Africana studies in general is where the 
body is located. For the purpose of this study the underlying question could have been, 
“What is the experience of this body of the black?” Historically, black bodies have been 
vehicles for war, shipped across the Atlantic Ocean, bought, sold, idolized, demonized, 
raped, whipped, emancipated, segregated, integrated, and studied. Blacks are located 
somewhere in the world. These essays were an attempt to locate the black body anew in 
educational spaces. This inquiry co-intended several artifacts to engage a potential profile 
of black experience. Doors, masks, and coins are described phenomenologically within 
these essays. It is as if the essays were an attempt to identify where the body might end 
and the self begins. This is where a Fanonian philosophy might fit within this series of 
essays. Fanon speaks of the body extending into spaces and being identified. A child’s 
exclaim of “Look! A Negro,” provokes a historical bend for Fanon, as he feels obligated 
to represent his race and ancestors. Thus a break in the body schema occurs which may 
be explained as history embedded upon the body. The appeal to history brings in Hegel 
and his movement toward becoming. Beginning with sense, a realization naturally 
emerges that presents the ‘thing-in-itself’. This thing, the black body, tenses against what 
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has been realized as opposed to its existence. The ability to exist and relate this existence 
is a disclosure of the soul. W. E. B. Dubois in his seminal text, Souls of Black Folk, 
answers the query of, “What does the soul (the black soul) look like? DuBois answers 
this while answering another question of interest: “What is the experience of the soul of 
black folk?” For DuBois, the black soul is immersed in the Negro spiritual, jazz; it 
mourns, and declares that it [the soul] was a self. Establishing a self requires the body to 
act in concert with such a realization. Malcolm X speaks of the black body and mind in 
relation to white bodies and mind [sets]. He appeals to the arts, politics, philosophy, 
spirituality, and history. In closing this group of essays I would like to perform a 
phenomenological analysis of the presented objects so far. Each will engage conversation 
with the philosophers that are of focus in each respective phenomenology. 
Phenomenology of a Backdoor (Woodson) 
 
 
[The] Negro’s mind has been brought under the control of the oppressor…When 
you control a man’s thinking…You do not need to send him to the back door…if 
there is [none], he will cut one for his special benefit. (Woodson, 1933/2000, p. 
xix) 
 
 
The natural attitude of the view of a backdoor is how a door appears in time and 
space. I actually started the co-intention of the door by describing the process of 
knocking on a door. My default perspective of knocking on an unfamiliar door is a public 
experience. Of course you can ring a doorbell, but the fact remains, strangers announce 
themselves with a sound of some type. The backdoor is different in that we often do not 
go to a backdoor as a stranger. Backdoors are usually hidden from view and have distinct 
purposes for their use. For instance a cookout in the “backyard” may require you to use 
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the backdoor to transport food from inside to outside and vice versa. The natural attitude 
begins to dissipate when the discussion of the door turns toward the use of backdoors 
during the time of Jim Crow. 
Sides, Aspects, Profiles 
The intention of a door in general was of two sides; being outside the door or on 
the inside. Aspects of the door were different levels of the door being ajar. I believe at 
one point I co-intend the door to be “cracked”. These aspects are profiles since they are 
momentary views of how the door may be presented. The key to a phenomenology of a 
backdoor is the front door being both shut and inaccessible as a means of entering a home 
or building. 
Parts and Wholes, Identity in Manifold, Presence and Absence 
The doors in and of themselves are no more that parts of a bigger building or 
home. They are pieces, independent parts from the whole. The fact that the whole is not 
of immediate importance makes this functional. Moments in this phenomenology are the 
presentations of the door as “cracked” or “ajar”. This is simply due to the fact that 
cracked or ajar do not occur unless there is first a door to carry out the degree of opening 
desired. 
The ways in which the door is possibly presented may be explained in terms of an 
identity in manifold or a range of ways in which a door can be presented. Again, we note 
that this is the activity of the front door. It was noted that the front door is open to the 
individual outside to the degree that they are known by the door opener. A door unopened 
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is also an identity presented and should be taken into account since it is relevant to the 
concepts discussed within this group of essays. 
Presence and absence is an essential part to this inquiry since I am not speaking 
about a physical door, but co-intending an imaginary one to understand the phenomenon. 
This empty intention targets the door that is not there (Sokolowski, 2008, p. 33). In my 
intention of a backdoor, I notice that there is no intentionality towards how the door may 
swing on a hinge, a doorknob, or even a frame. It is as if the doorway is empty of any 
obstruction. I believe this was done purposefully to make a point. 
Phenomenological Attitude 
For Woodson, the back door is crafted. Entrance into the phenomenological 
attitude begins here. It answers the question of the doorness of a backdoor. In the essay 
entitled “Fanon’s Backdoor”, doors are described in terms of boundaries, the thin veneer 
of a coin’s front and back, and even violence. Doors are individualized experiences not 
just points of entry and exit. Keeping with the spirit of urdoxa, that there is a world and I 
am in the world, the activity at the door is nothing supernatural or extraordinary 
(Sokolowski, 2008, p. 45). These phenomenological reductions produce such things as 
backdoor users (Woodson calls them crafters) having valueless value and the door that 
exists is the demarcation between the body and the world. This of course is keeping 
somewhat with the spirit of Fanon in his work in Black Skin White Masks. 
In order to enter the phenomenological attitude there is a need to bracket. 
Bracketing is similar to using brackets or parentheses in order to separate a portion of text 
in a sentence. A common method of bracketing that I use to break from the natural 
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attitude and begin a reduction into the phenomenological attitude is questioning. For 
instance I question the door and the phenomenon throughout these essays in terms of the 
question of, “What is the experience of…?” This neutralizes my natural intention enough 
to attempt to look at the phenomenon from more of an initial gaze. These questions act as 
an epoche, “a neutralization of natural intentions” (Sokolowski, 2008, p. 49). For a 
discussion of Woodson and the backdoor of his work, it helps to build a case for a 
backdoor of Fanon, which I discuss as violence, a regular theme of his work and an 
apparent method of realization for the oppressed of the Third World and other groups 
worldwide. 
The relation to education is that a “backdoor” mentality as described by Woodson 
may also be one with the need for violent realization. Perhaps this explains some of our 
disproportionate rates for African-American males in public schools. More examination 
would be required of course. But the process of explaining, “What is the experience at the 
door?” begins a discussion of where the individual may potentially locate themselves. 
The challenge for the educator is to help them move from a place where they are seen as 
strangers, to a place where they can learn effectively. This begins by answering the query 
at the door of, “Who is it?” 
Phenomenology of a Veil (W. E. B. DuBois) 
 
 
[The] Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-
sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other 
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always 
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his 
two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
134 
 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone 
keeps it from being torn asunder. (DuBois, 1989, p. 45) 
 
 
The DuBoisian veil is admittedly one of my favorite essays in this work because it 
helped me personally to further see the brilliance of his work. A DuBoisian veil takes on 
many forms in this essay. The natural attitude begins with a veil on a literal statue, that of 
Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee University. I actually looked at a picture of this 
particular statue from the different sides that it was presented online while writing the 
essay. You can view the statue from the front, the sides, the back or a bird’s eye view 
from the top if there are no trees blocking your line of sight. From these sides different 
aspects of the statue occur that produce a profile that sparks to question of whether 
Washington is lifting or lowering the veil. 
Presence and Absence 
The veil and the Tuskegee presentation of its existence showcase a distinct profile 
of how the veil is given. Veils are meant for the viewer. This claim is physically 
represented in the veil of Algerian women from Fanon’s A Dying Colonialism. The 
presence of a veil at the exclusion and absence of a face brings us to an empty intention 
of what the face might look like. Reflection upon the veil, what lies beneath it, and what 
it means to unveil something brought about a type of absolute absence, invisibility. 
Invisibility and the Phenomenological Attitude  
Ralph Ellison is used to discuss the link between the veil and invisibility since 
both are used in his text entitled Invisible Man. There is a veiled/unveiled statue and his 
protagonist that exclaims his invisibility due to others wishing not to see him (Ellison, 
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1995). The phenomenological reduction occurs when bracketing the natural attitude in 
terms of a veil and conventional definitions of invisibility to discuss how invisible people 
might appear in spite of their invisibility. Here an ontological way to reduction was 
partially used (Sokolowski, 2008, p. 52). This way to reduction is an appeal to human 
desire to be truly and fully scientific (Sokolowski, 2008, p. 52). In the likeness of a 
sociologist or anthropologist I conclude my analysis of the veil in terms of hunters and 
soldiers who “wear camouflage”. Comparing the two groups of individuals in a setting 
outside of a theatre of battle or the hunt I attempt to “uncover” the veil. 
Links to Education 
From an educational standpoint there are some in spaces of learning that attempt 
to be “invisible”. DuBois (1989) notes that the Negro is born with the veil (p. 45). 
However, being born with does not denote understanding. The birth with a veil speaks to 
a history as opposed to an individualized phenomenon. An Algerian woman may be said 
to be “born with a veil” due to her culture. Perhaps this is to say that the veil is embedded 
on her person only to be realized later as a physical manifestation of what it means to be 
both Algerian and a woman all at the same time. The veil serves this purpose as well. We 
are cognizant of a veil when there is knowledge available to comprehend. Here we can 
discuss the “experience of the veil”. Worn on the occasion of knowledge of the self as 
being someone of two-ness, it is a splitting of who we believe we are to accommodate the 
fact of being and becoming when confronted with others. 
The significance of the veil in education is our capacity to recognize the 
contribution of a group of people being worth noting. We could say here in Ellison’s 
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terms that Black History is a for instance of being invisible, not because it is not there, 
but because there is a lack of acknowledgment towards the contribution globally and 
locally for Africana people groups. As Woodson points out, what contributions of the 
Bantus, people of the Caribbean and even within our own continent are we missing. This 
is my reason for the quote at the end of the DuBois essay that states, “Perhaps we are all 
just invisible people.” 
Phenomenology of Brown vs. Board (Georg Wilhelm Hegel) 
 
 
The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the 
former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom 
may be explained to be a false form of the plant’s existence, for the fruit appears 
as its true nature in place of the blossom. The ceaseless activity of their own 
inherent nature makes these stages moments of an organic unity, where they not 
merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; 
and constitutes thereby the life of the whole. (Hegel, 1977, p. 2) 
 
 
The phenomenological attitude of a Brown vs. Board reduction occurs through the 
examination of the experience of the legislation in dialectical terms. In order to engage in 
a phenomenology where a Hegelian dialectic occurs, we must begin without 
presuppositions. The issue here is that in the engagement of such a concept as racial 
equality, presuppositions of racial ineptitude and superiority are present before any 
examination of ontology, negation, or becoming can emerge. However, a transcendental 
ego discloses that even in seeking racial equality in education a paradigm occurs. In 
seeking to “become” equal we admit we are not equal whether this equality is based on 
neglect or not.  
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For this examination I looked at race itself as a noema, an object to be perceived. 
Race, the noema, is showcased by the noesis of perception and imagination. Bracketing 
race, our perceptions of it, our experience of it in the natural attitude, and the 
misconception that are conveyed in the perception and imagination we begin to see that 
race is not so much about a differentiated color as it is about a fear of the unknown. What 
will happen if black and white children adhere together in environs of education? This, 
along with the evidence inherent in paradigms, is disclosed in an examination of the 
experience of the black in the “spirit” of Hegel. 
Phenomenology of the Black Body (Frantz Fanon) 
 
 
O my body, make me always a man who questions! (Fanon, 1952/2008, p. 206) 
 
 
Fanon’s noema in all of his work generally consists of either the colonized body 
or the colonized mind. As opposed to just race, Fanon examines how the racialized body 
experiences different spaces. He uses imagination, psychiatric evidence and tradition, 
history, and his own personal experience. This bend toward the body describes his 
discussion of sexuality and miscegenation in Black Skin White Masks and his chagrin at 
the little girl calling out his unavoidable plight of being a “Negro”. The “black” body in 
education is a noema more often than the “black” mind. Bracketing the term black in 
racialized contexts we begin to see a trend of negativity inherent in Fanon’s work in 
Black Skin White Masks. The black is not white. Therefore, if white is A, then black is 
always not A. We might say this syllogism is constantly refreshed when black bodies 
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enter spaces populated predominantly by bodies that happen to be white. Perhaps like 
DuBois, a student that is within a black body ever feels his two-ness.  
The body as a noema causes it to be under constant observation in order to 
disclose both its blackness and its “bodyness”. In terms of “bodyness” there is 
comparison in terms of the presences (similarities) and absences (differences) between 
black bodies and white bodies. What is the identity of the body that happens to be black? 
If it is different from that of the white body, perhaps it is to be feared. Could this explain 
why school-aged children in black bodies are being expelled from school and 
recommended for special education in disproportionate rates in comparison to their 
white-bodied counterparts? Perhaps Fanon’s Manicheanism isn’t in folly, but insightful 
when applied in its proper context of psychological significance. Maybe it isn’t a race 
issue at all, but a lebenwelt, a life-world we have created that just happens to have its 
instructions tattooed upon the flesh of black skin. 
Phenomenology of Racialized History (Malcolm X) 
 
 
But people are always speculating—why am I as I am? To understand that of any 
person, his whole life, from birth must be reviewed. All of our experiences fuse 
into our personality. Everything that ever happened to us is an ingredient…(X, 
1992, p. 150) 
 
 
Malcolm X relates experience with ingredients. Using history as a noema in the 
essay, “That Rock Landed on Us”, we find that the object of our introspection possibly 
has not been fully disclosed in modern society. This is evidenced in a bend in my state of 
North Carolina to decrease more and more of the material covered within U.S. History 
courses. Generally, we see information detailing the plight of Africana peoples and 
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immigrants usually is the first to be discarded. So we might say that there is a 
phenomenological “absence” in our history curriculum. A transcendental ego might see 
this neglect is like romanticism in the work of a Shakespeare or Ovid. The Malcolm X 
essay might be read to say, why do we romanticize our history? What is so bad about our 
history in terms of race that we discard or hide pages of it? Perhaps because of the 
embarrassment or shame in knowing after the revelation of our perceptions and 
immaturity of the past, we see our folly, but refuse to accept it.  
Towards a Phenomenology of Mis-Education 
Carter G. Woodson began my dialogue about the phenomenon of racialized space 
in education. Woodson’s backdoor to me was a phenomenological door. It emerge not 
because of a literal hinge, knob, or piece of sturdy wood being hung in space, but because 
something was and is shut to this particular group of people. This group just happens to 
be a population of which I belong. My concern is that we will allow eighty more, fifty 
more, or even ten more years to pass without any changes to the current issues of 
Africana peoples in education. Again, I use the Africana paradigm as a beginning due to 
the disproportionate numbers located within this group and the potential to help others 
with the insight gleaned from the hardships or self-imposed setbacks of this substantially 
impacted group. I feel phenomenological inquiry may be a means to begin examining 
some of those things that currently hinder this group. 
It is interesting to note how much in Africana studies has a phenomenological 
turn to its realization. We see a lot of problematic thinking and emphasis in this 
scholarship. Perhaps it is the time of slavery or the distrust earned from the periods after 
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slavery, post-Civil Rights Act, and into now in our post-modern age that discriminates in 
an often covert manner. For all of these phenomena experienced by people in public 
space, phenomenology may serve as a means of disclosure and clarity. 
As I conclude this piece on phenomenology I do so with the understanding that 
this work and those like it are just a beginning. This series of essays is just a start to a 
conversation, a dialogue in which a concept like mis-education is now moved into the 
public. With the close of this work I still feel as if there are some inadequacies in 
explanation that perhaps a reader of this work may challenge or contend with in order to 
further clarify the verity of these phenomenological essays. But, this is a start to this line 
of philosophical inquiry. 
From this phenomenological examination of mis-education, I would like to 
explore areas outside of the classroom and within a broader conversation within the lived 
world of the black or even other representative groups. Examination of areas explored by 
the philosophers mentioned in this work may be explored, such as those that operate 
within the “underground economy”, those that have succumbed to the effects of the 
criminal justice system through incarceration, members of gangs, and even members of 
academia or the church that have experienced success, yet still feel the “horrors” of life 
within a relegated way of being in the world. These areas again are chosen in order to 
continue to realize an answer to the original question asked in my phenomenological 
query of, “what is the experience of the black in mis-education?” 
I have gleaned from this work a perspective of my theme of mis-education 
through the lenses of the respective philosophers used. However, what haunts me about 
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these essays is the reality of what would the individuals studied within this work have to 
say about my development of their seminal texts. Most notably to me would be Fanon 
and Malcolm X who might be said to mirror one another in some ways. As an avid reader 
within the genre of horror I could see their work as an extension of the tragic genre. What 
does it mean to be in horror in real life? Perhaps it is the veracity of horrible 
circumstances that make it so. But, even more in horror and the requisite genre is the 
everyday, “normal” manifestations of life that puts the reader or purveyor right in the 
midst of the activity that horrifies the encapsulated characters. We are not horrified by a 
genre that cannot relate to our “everydayness”. Fanon and Malcolm X, along with other 
Africana philosophers, women, and ethnic and racialized scholars, explain the “normal” 
in their work which makes it so poignant and impactful to the reader. Yet, the summation 
of horror is that at its resolution is at least a glimmer, an inkling of hope. 
For the horror of an “everyday” life that may possibly “normalize” inequalities, 
tragedy, and an existence that might be interpreted as painful, there is hope if we could 
just reflect on the core principle of phenomenology, that of urdoxa, Husserl’s lebenwelt, a 
life-world, a world in which we, you and I, live. Because there is hope we can be hopeful 
for the potential of change to occur. Again this work is just a start along the route of that 
process of being in the world.  
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